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Abstract
In this thesis we study the security of a number of dedicated cryptographic hash
functions against cryptanalytic attacks.
We begin with an introduction to what cryptographic hash functions are and
what they are used for. This is followed by strict definitions of the security properties
often required from cryptographic hash functions.
FSB hashes are a class of hash functions derived from a coding theory problem.
We attack FSB by modeling the compression function of the hash by a matrix in
GF(2). We show that collisions and preimages can easily be found in FSB with the
proposed security parameters.
We describe a meet-in-the-middle attack against the FORK-256 hash function.
The attack requires 2112.8 operations to find a collision, which is a 38000-fold im-
provement over the expected 2128 operations.
We then present a method for finding slid pairs for the compression function
of SHA-1; pairs of inputs and messages that produce closely related outputs in the
compression function. We also cryptanalyse two block ciphers based on the com-
pression function of MD5, MDC-MD5 and the Kaliski-Robshaw “Crab” encryption
algorithm.
VSH is a hash function based on problems in number theory that are believed to
be hard. The original proposal only claims collision resistance; we demonstrate that
VSH does not meet the other hash function requirements of preimage resistance,
one-wayness, and collision resistance of truncated variants.
To explore more general cryptanalytic attacks, we discuss the d-Monomial test, a
statistical test that has been found to be effective in distinguishing iterated Boolean
circuits from real random functions. The test is applied to the SHA and MD5 hash
functions.
2
3We present a new hash function proposal, LASH, and its initial cryptanalysis.
The LASH design is based on a simple underlying primitive, and some of its security
can be shown to be related to lattice problems.
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Notation
a[i] C-like vectors: a indexed by i.
x← y Assigning y to the variable x.
|S| Number of elements in the set S.
x⊕ y Bitwise exclusive-or (xor) between x and y.⊕y
i=1 xi Equal to x0 ⊕ x1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ xy.
x ∧ y Logical bitwise and between x and y.
x ∨ y Logical bitwise or between x and y.
¬ x Logical complement of x, limited to word size.
x | y Concatenation of bit strings x and y.
x¢ y Equal to (x+ y) mod 232.
x¯ y Equal to (x− y) mod 232.
x << y Left shift of x by y positions.
x >> y Right shift of x by y positions, discarding the least significant bits.
x≪ y Circular left shift of 32-bit word x by y bits.
x≫ y Circular right shift of 32-bit word x by y bits.(
a
n
)
Jacobi symbol of a modulo n.
x ≈ y Approximate equivalence of x and y.
x¿ y Expression x is insignificant when compared to y.
MT Transpose of matrix M.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Hash functions play an important role in many areas of computer science, especially
in sorting, searching, and cryptology. All of these roles require different algorithmic
properties; a hash function intended for a search algorithm does not necessarily
have the properties required in cryptology.
This thesis is about dedicated cryptographic hash functions, rather than hash
functions in general. Dedicated hash functions are defined by deterministic algo-
rithms that have been specifically designed for cryptographic purposes.
Security is the most essential feature of a cryptographic hash function. A se-
cure hash function is resistant to the techniques of cryptanalysis, the art of breaking
cryptosystems.
1.1 Basic Uses of Cryptographic Hash Functions
Hash functions have found many uses as building blocks of more complex crypto-
graphic mechanisms and protocols. Most security engineers see a hash function as
a convenient and readily available random “scrambling” function that takes in an
arbitrary block of data and returns a fixed-size bit string.
Hash functions have been standardized for use as a component of digital signa-
ture algorithms, integrity checking, and pseudorandom bit generators (key genera-
tors).
A common use of hash functions is to compute and verify “fingerprints” of data
files. These can be used to uniquely identify messages and to detect transmission
errors, changes and even intentional malicious manipulation. In Linux, command-
line tools for forming secure fingerprints of messages are usually readily available.
Computing a SHA-1 [77] hash of the message "Hello" is easy:
$ echo "Hello" > hello.txt
11
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$ sha1sum hello.txt
1d229271928d3f9e2bb0375bd6ce5db6c6d348d9 hello.txt
The hexadecimal string 1d229271928d3f9e2bb0375bd6ce5db6c6d348d9 is the
160-bit result of the hash function. If the hash function is secure, it should be
computationally infeasible to find another message that produces the same hash
result.
1.1.1 Password Storage
My personal interest in hash functions was sparked in 1993 when, as a teenager, I
discovered that a hash function is used to store passwords in UNIX-like systems. I
wanted to find faster ways to crack passwords, which got me interested in the inner
workings of the crypt(3) hash function.
In UNIX-like systems, such as Linux and BSD, passwords are stored in files
/etc/passwd or /etc/shadow. These files contain lines such as:
root:w1njb/hWox7tc:0:0:System Administrator:/root:/bin/sh
Here “w1njb/hWox7tc” is the hash of the root password. During login, the
hash of the entered password is computed and compared to the hash stored in the
database to determine whether to grant access or not.
By mid-1970s Robert Morris (Bell Labs) and others had realised that if pass-
words are stored as they are entered, in plaintext form, a compromise of a root
(administrator) - level user account on one system would lead to compromise of
other systems. Encryption of passwords is not really a solution, as an administrator
may obtain the key and decrypt the passwords that way. The current practice of
using a one-way hash function has proved to be a be a highly secure and practical
solution [73].
1.1.2 Hash Functions in Communication
Hash functions can also be used to construct Message Authentication Codes (MACs).
In this role, a hash function is used to combine a secret authentication key with the
message to produce a MAC.
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Secure communication protocols such as SSH [117, 118, 119, 120], TLS and
SSL [34] use the hash-based HMAC [9] to deter attempts to manipulate traffic in
transit. These protocols also use hashes for key generation.
1.1.3 Digital Signatures
Most digital signature schemes require that a hash function is used to produce a
condensed version of the data, called a message digest. We will briefly describe
the use of the Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA) in the U.S. Digital Signature Standard
(DSS) [77, 78, 79].
Digital signature mechanisms generally consist of three components; key gener-
ation, signature generation, and signature verification. Secure hashes are used by
all of these components in DSS.
1. In key generation, a set of secret and public parameters are generated with a
pseudorandom bit generator and various number-theoretic algorithms (such
as primality testing). The pseudorandom bit generator uses a hash function to
mix the input entropy and to produce random bits. This necessitates the re-
quirements of pseudorandomness and preimage resistance discussed in Chap-
ter 2.
2. When creating a signature, a message digest is first computed. After appropri-
ate padding, the actual Digital Signature Algorithm is applied to the message
digest, resulting in a signature. It is vital that finding two messages that pro-
duce the same digest is hard, as otherwise the same signature would authen-
ticate both. This necessitates the requirement of collision resistance discussed
in Chapter 2.
3. When verifying the validity of a signature, the message digest must also be
computed. A number-theoretic transform using the signer’s public key param-
eters are then used to verify the signature.
The DSS standard text [78] specifies how the Secure Hash Algorithm [77, 79] is
used in all of these roles.
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1.2 Publication History and Birth of this Thesis
The main body of this thesis consists of a number of contributions to the cryptanal-
ysis of hash functions, and material in each chapter (apart from the introduction)
has been published separately in scientific workshops and conferences. It therefore
makes sense to record the birth history of each chapter separately.
In this thesis we introduce cryptanalytic results on the Fast Syndrome Based
Hash [4, 38], FORK-256 [53], SHACAL [49, 50], VSH [22] and LASH [11] hash
functions.
Material in Chapter 3 originated during my visit to INRIA Rocquencourt in June
2006, but took a further year to reach maturity, and eventually publication as [100].
I am grateful to my INRIA hosts Anne Canteaut and Nicolas Sendrier.
Chapter 4 came about in July 2007 as I was simply looking for hash functions to
break. The same analysis has also been published as [101]. Thanks to Keith Martin
for proofreading it and suggesting improvements.
Chapter 5 is the product of a long process, and some of the material was orig-
inally presented in the rump session of Eurocrypt 2002 and eventually in more
complete form in FSE 2003 [96]. The material has been further adapted to this
text. Thanks to my (then) NOKIA Colleague and Helsinki University of Technology
supervisor, Kaisa Nyberg.
Chapter 6 would not exist without the insistence of Kenny Paterson that publi-
cation of relatively simple results on VSH were important for “real world” security
engineers. My thesis supervisor Keith Martin greatly helped with the quality, as did
Daniel J. Bernstein, who suggested including worked-out examples of the attacks.
The results have been published as [99].
I am grateful for the encouragement of Keith Martin when I decided to work on
the relatively vague ideas that led to the study of d-Monomial tests that resulted in
the material in Chapter 7. Portions of the material, in the context of stream cipher
analysis, have been published as [97, 98].
For material in Chapter 8, which specifies and cryptanalyses LASH, I am grateful
to LASH co-designers K. Bentahar, D. Page, J.H. Silverman and N. Smart. The work
was initiated when Daniel Page visited Royal Holloway to give a presentation about
an initial version of LASH in December 2005. I returned the favour in March 2006
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by visiting Bristol with a presentation about my cryptanalysis of LASH. Security
parameters were modified, a new analysis section attached to the paper and LASH
finally reached publication in [11]. Compared to that work, I have removed the
material that I did not contribute to, namely the lattice-based security proofs and
the performance analysis.
1.3 Significance: Relation to the SHA-3 Project
Serious security weaknesses were found in 2005 in the U.S. Standard Secure Hash
Algorithm (SHA) by a group of Chinese researchers led by X. Wang [112]. As the
security of most digital signatures and therefore the security of e-commerce and e-
government relies on SHA, the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST) responded by initiating a project to find a secure replacement to the current
SHA. The new algorithm will be designated SHA-3 [80].
The SHA-3 selection project is organised as an international competition. A
call for candidate algorithms was issued and by the October 31, 2008 deadline,
56 algorithms wassubmitted, of which 51 proceeded to the “first round”. Out of
these 51, fourteen were selected to the “second round” in July 2009. Seventeen of
the original proposals have already been conceded broken or withdrawn by their
designers as of October 2009 [81].
Even though the analysis contained in this thesis mostly predates these signif-
icant events, the results contained in this thesis may have an effect on the final
selection of SHA-3.
CHAPTER 2
HASH FUNCTION FUNDAMENTALS
In this chapter we provide a technical description of hash functions in general –
what they are, and what constitutes a cryptographically sound hash function.
Section 2.1 contains an overview of hash function properties, and explains the
philosophy behind our technical definitions for various hash function properties.
We then discuss these properties and their relationships in detail in the subsequent
sections 2.2 – 2.7.
There are security properties of hash functions which are outside the scope of
this thesis. These are summarised in Section 2.8.
2.1 Basic Definition of a Hash Function
There are several properties that may be required in a hash function, depending on
application. In its most basic form, a hash function can be defined as follows.
Definition 2.1. A hash function h is an algorithm that maps input from an arbitrary
finite number of bits to n bits:
h : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}n. (2.1)
We shall shortly describe properties that are often associated with cryptographic
hash functions. These properties are not necessarily required in non-cryptographic
applications of hash functions, such as sorting and searching.
Efficiency. Given any input x, the hash result h(x) can be computed efficiently
and with negligible amount of memory.
Preimage resistance. Given an output y, it is computationally hard to find
any input x that satisfies h(x) = y.
16
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Second preimage resistance. Given x, it is computationally hard to find x′
that satisfies h(x) = h(x′) with x 6= x′.
Collision resistance. It is computationally hard to find x and x′, x 6= x′, that
satisfy h(x) = h(x′).
Pseudorandomness. A hash function should closely resemble a random func-
tion.
Many reference works and textbooks in cryptology contain definitions of these
properties that are based on a somewhat vague notion of computational infeasibility.
Apart from the computational efficiency of a hash function itself, other properties of
a hash function cannot be rigorously proved for any specific hash function without
restrictive assumptions about the computational model used.
The properties of preimage resistance, collision resistance, and pseudorandom-
ness exist “until proven otherwise”. For the purposes of this thesis we therefore give
definitions in the negative; we define what it means for a hash function to not have
these properties. These definitions can also be viewed as definitions of a successful
cryptanalysis of a hash function – what it means for a hash function to be broken.
For a broader discussion about hash function properties we refer to Rogaway and
Shrimpton [91, 92].
2.2 Efficiency
Most practical hash functions are iterated hash functions, which means that input is
sliced into shorter blocks that are processed iteratively using a compression function
that has fixed input and output sizes.
Definition 2.2 (Iterated Hash Function). Let f : {0, 1}m+b → {0, 1}m be a com-
pression function that takes in an m-bit state and a b-bit input block to produce a
new m-bit state. To compute a hash of an n-bit input, it is recoded into b-bit blocks
B1, B2, · · ·Bdn/be. Starting with initialization vector IV0 we iterate
IVi = f(IVi−1 | Bi) for i = 1, 2, · · · , dn/be. (2.2)
The final IVdn/be is the hash result.
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We note that a compression function is a (fixed input size) hash function. Hence
the construction given by Definition 2.2 can be used recursively, opening up oppor-
tunities to exploit computational parallelism available in modern CPUs. The MD6
hash function is an important recent example of this [90], although parallelism was
already considered by Damga˚rd in his classic work [32].
Figure 2.1 illustrates the operation of an iterated hash function. The following
additional transformations may be used in iterated hash function constructions:
Padding and Recoding. The message input may be modified in some way for
the compression function. Typical recoding transformations include padding
(with the message length) and various key transformations.
Final Transformation. Not all of the internal state information of the hash
function needs to be returned as the hash function result. The final transfor-
mation may use the total message length as a parameter.
It seems that without padding or final transformation an iterated hash function
cannot be secure when b > 1. The following efficiency theorem follows directly
from the observation that the number of iterations is directly proportional to input
size and the amount of information transferred between iterations is limited by the
state size of the hash function, which is equal to m bits in Definition 2.2.
Theorem 2.1 (Linear Complexity of Iterated Hash Functions). The execution time t
of an iterated hash function with n-bit input is bound by t ≤ k(n + 1) for some fixed
value k.
Proof. The claim follows trivially from the observation that the number of blocks
to be processed by the compression function is dn/be in Equation 2.2. Hence k
approximately represents the execution time required by the compression function
to process a single input bit.
Practical compression functions are deterministic and have a nearly constant
execution time for each input block.
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2.3 Preimage Resistance
Preimage resistance is close to the intuitive notion of non-invertibility. If n > m, it
is obvious that a number of messages will produce the same hash.
Definition 2.3 (Preimage Resistance). Let R ⊆ {0, 1}m be any subset of possible
hash results whose individual members can be identified or generated in unit time t. A
hash function h is not preimage-resistant if an algorithm exists that given y, selected
at random from R, it finds a message x satisfying h(x) = y in significantly less than
|R| × t time.
If we choose R = {0, 1}m as the range, Definition 2.3 implies that search for an
inverse should require O(2m) time. Note that there is no requirement for a hash
function to be surjective; an inverse may simply not exist.
It is clear that preimage resistance is exceedingly difficult (if not impossible) to
prove in a general setting. However, hash functions are regularly broken and hence
proofs of particular hash functions not being preimage resistant are common. The
wording of Definition 2.3 reflects this.
The reason why we use R in Definition 2.3 is to imply that there should not be
any class of messages that is particularly easy to invert. An example is the RSA public
key operation with short exponents, which is easily invertible for short messages and
hence not fully preimage resistant without additional measures [51].
2.4 Second Preimage Resistance
Second-preimage resistance is a slightly stronger notion than preimage resistance.
Intuitively it means that it is difficult to find a message that produces the same hash
as another, known message.
IV 0 f f f f IV dn/be
B1 B2 B3 Bdn/be· · ·
Message to be hashed
Initial
Value
Hash
Result
Figure 2.1: Iterated hash function.
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Definition 2.4 (Second preimage resistance.). Let D ⊆ {0, 1}n be any set of messages
whose individual members can be identified or generated in unit time t. A hash func-
tion h is not second preimage-resistant if an algorithm exists that given x, selected at
random from D, it finds a message x′, x 6= x′, satisfying h(x) = h(x′) in significantly
less than min(|D|, 2m)× t time.
Recall from Definition 2.2 that m is the size of the hash function result. Intu-
itively, second preimage resistance is very closely related to preimage resistance,
except that there is another message to help the preimage search.
First preimage resistance does not imply second preimage resistance. This can
be be shown as follows: Let h′ be a hash function derived from a hash function h
so that h′(x) = h(x ∨ 1); the least significant bit of the message is always set before
hash computation. The function h′ is not second preimage resistant as the second
message is always easy to find; h′(x) = h′(x⊕ 1). However, h′ is as (first) preimage
resistant as h is since discarding source bits does not make a preimage search any
easier.
2.5 Collision Resistance
Collision resistance means that it is difficult to find two messages that produce the
same hash.
Definition 2.5. A hash function h is not collision resistant if an algorithm exists that
finds two messages x and x′ satisfying h(x) = h(x′) in less than O(2m/2) time.
The complexity given above, O(2m/2), is essentially the square root of the range
of the hash function. This bound is based on the Birthday Theorem [76]. 1
Theorem 2.2 (Birthday Theorem). Let p(r; l) denote the probability that when l ele-
ments are chosen at random from a set of r elements, all of the elements are distinct.
The probability function satisfies Equation 2.3:
lim
r→∞ p(r;
√
(2 ln 2)r) =
1
2
. (2.3)
1The Birthday Therem is often referred to as the Birthday Paradox, even though it is not actually a
paradox.
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Since this technical formulation of the well-known Birthday Theorem is different
from the simple asymptotic statements contained in most textbooks and reference
works, we will give a proof for completeness.
Proof. Let L1, L2, L3, · · · be a sequence of elements where each Li is randomly cho-
sen from a set of r elements so that the sequence satisfies Li 6= Lj for all 1 ≤ j < i.
Clearly L1 can be chosen r ways, L2 from a set of r − 1 elements and more gener-
ally Li from a set of r − i + 1 elements. The total number of possible collision-free
sequences of length l is therefore given by
∏l−1
i=0 r − i. Since there are a total of
rl sequences of length l with members from a set of size r, the probability of no
collision occurring in a sequence is given by:
p(r; l) =
l−1∏
i=1
(1− i
r
). (2.4)
To approximate this equation for large r, we first note that by the binomial
theorem,
(1− 1
r
)i =
i∑
k=0
(
i
k
)
1
(−r)k (2.5)
= 1− i
r
+
i2 − i
2r2
− i
3 − 3i2 + 2i
6r3
+ · · · . (2.6)
When r is large compared to i, say i < r2/3, the terms quickly vanish when k ≥ 2
and we may write (1− ir ) ≈ (1− 1r )i. We arrive at the following approximation for
Equation 2.4, that is accurate when l¿ r:
p(r; l) = (1− 1
r
)
l(l−1)
2 . (2.7)
By taking logarithms on both sides and substituting p(r; l) = 12 , we obtain
ln
1
2
=
l(l − 1)
2
ln(1− 1
r
). (2.8)
From the well-known series ln(1− 1/x) = −∑∞i=1 i−1x−i it can be seen that ln(1−
1
r ) ≈ −r−1 for large r. With this substitution and by solving the quadratic equation
and removing vanishing terms, we can write a concise solution of l as a function of
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r at the point where the probability of collision is 12 :
l =
√
(2 ln 2)r ≈ 1.1774√r. (2.9)
Intuitively, the Birthday Theorem means that one chooses
√
(2 ln 2)r random
elements from a large set of size r, the probability that at least one element gets
chosen more than once approaches 12 .
We note that limr→∞ p(r,
√
r) = 1− e− 12 ≈ 0.3935. We can therefore asymptoti-
cally state that collisions in a set of O(n) elements occur after O(
√
n) elements have
been chosen and that an n-bit collision resistant hash function has at most O(2
n
2 )
security against collision search.
2.5.1 Collision Resistance of Iterated Hash Functions
There is a strong relationship between the collision resistance of a compression
function and the collision resistance of the hash function as a whole.
Theorem 2.3. Let h be an iterated hash function with a fixed IV (Definition 2.2) and
a collision resistant padding or final transformation (Section 2.2). If the compression
function of h is collision resistant, then h is collision resistant. If h is not collision
resistant, then its compression function is not collision resistant.
Proof. If there is a collision h(x) = h(x′) in the full hash function, then there must
be some pair of state variables IVi−1, IV ′i′−1 and input blocks Bi, B′i′ so that
f(IVi−1 | Bi) = f(IV ′i′−1 | B′i′); a collision in the hash function always implies
a collision in the compression function. Therefore any efficient way of finding col-
lisions in a hash implies an efficient way of finding collisions in the compression
function.
Hash functions may have non-bijective final transformations where the entire
state is not used as the hash function result; in such a case a hash collision can be
caused by the final transformation, not the compression function.
Despite Theorem 2.3, hash function collision resistance and its compression
function collision resistance and are not strictly equivalent. A compression func-
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tion collision with arbitrary input state values does not necessarily imply that there
is a collision in the actual hash function. There must also be a sequence of messages
that derives the state variables IVi1 and IV
′
i′−1 from the common initialization vec-
tor IV 0.
With some hash functions, hash function compression function collisions have
been discovered by cryptanalysts long before “full” collisions were found. Hans
Dobbertin gave collisions in the compression function of MD5 in 1996 [35], but it
took another eight years for X. Wang and H. Yu to break the full MD5 [113].
2.5.2 An Algorithm for Finding Collisions
A naive algorithm for finding hash function collisions would simply create a list of
hashes xi = h(i), i = 1, 2, 3, · · · , until a matching pair xi = xj , j < i is found.
The list search can be sped up by sorting and searching algorithms such as merge-
sort and binary search, requiring about O[(log r)
√
r] memory. This method requires
O(
√
r) memory, and therefore soon becomes infeasible for large r [61].
Fortunately there are methods for collision search that require a negligible amount
of memory, yet have the same asymptotic speed. The first one that was published is
due to Floyd (Section 3.1, Exercise 6 in [60]).
Let r be the range of a hash function h that we assume to behave like a random
function. Consider a sequence xi defined as follows:
x0 = arbitrary initial value,
xi = h(xi−1) for i ≥ 1.
Since each mapping is essentially random, after j ≈ √r steps we can expect a
matching pair xi = xj , i < j to be found. It follows that:
xi = xj ,
xi+1 = xj+1,
xi+2 = xj+2,
· · ·
xk = xk+(j−i) for all k ≥ i.
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x0 x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6
x7
x8
x9
x10
x11
x12
x13
x14
x15
Figure 2.2: A hash cycle.
The sequence enters a cycle of length j − i after j steps. The leading i steps are
sometimes called the tail of the cycle.
This is illustrated in Figure 2.2, where we can see that x16 = x5, and therefore
x17 = x6, x18 = x7, etc. The cycle length is 16− 5 = 11 and the tail has 5 elements.
The first collision pair is h(x4) = h(x15).
Floyd’s algorithm, which is given as Algorithm 2.1, finds collisions by simultane-
ously keeping track of two sequences xk and x2k for k = 0, 1, 2, · · · . It is easy to see
that there there will be a match xk = x2k when k reaches the cycle length j−i. After
finding a “marker” for the cycle length, a collision can be found by stepping xk a fur-
ther i steps, while also keeping track of x0, x1, · · · , xi. When these sequences match
at xi = xk+i, a collision has been found. The preimages are xi−1 6= xk+i−1. By exam-
ining Algorithm 2.1, it is easy to see that memory usage is negligible (four variables
x, y, tx and ty) and that collision search complexity is equivalent to 3j − i = O(
√
r)
hash function computations.
The algorithm can be parallelized so that the speedup is almost linear in rela-
tionship to the number of processors used. It is also possible to trade memory so
that the constant factor can be reduced to be close to one. Techniques for parallel
collision search are discussed in [108, 86].
2.5.3 Reducing the Range
The collision search complexity O(
√
r) is dependent on the size of the range (num-
ber of possible outcomes), rather than the number of bits produced by the hash
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Algorithm 2.1 Floyd’s Cycle-Finding Algorithm for Collisions
1: x← 0 Initialization
2: y ← 0
3: repeat
4: x← h(x) Single step on x.
5: y ← h(h(y)) Two steps on y.
6: until x = y Repeat until a match y = xi−j is found.
7: y ← 0 Reset y to the start value.
8: repeat
9: (tx, ty)← (x, y) Store preimages.
10: x← h(x) Single step on x.
11: y ← h(y) Single step on y.
12: until x = y Repeat until a collision is found.
13: return (tx, ty) Return the colliding pair.
function. Sometimes it is possible to use an auxiliary function to modify input to the
hash function so that the output range will be reduced. An example is a recoding
method for the input that forces certain bits of the hash function value to a fixed
value. An example of such recoding is given in an attack of the LASH hash function
given in Chapter 8 of this thesis.
Let f be an input mapping that satisfies the following criteria:
1. Computation of f does not requires significantly greater time than computa-
tion of h.
2. The range is reduced: h(f(x)) ∈ R, where the range r′ = |R | satisfies r ¿ 2m.
3. The input mapping f does not cause collisions; x 6= y ⇒ f(x) 6= f(y).
Collision search algorithms are used with a slightly modified iterated sequence:
x0 = arbitrary initial value
xi = h(f(xi−1)) for i ≥ 1.
Since each element xi ∈ R, complexity of the collision search becomes O(
√
r′).
2.5.4 Multicollisions in Iterated Hash Functions
Finding multiple collisions for an iterated hash function is not much harder than
finding a single collision. It is clear that a single collision in the compression function
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leads to an arbitrary number of collisions; if h(x) = h(x′) is a collision, we may
simply append arbitrary blocks y at the end of the message and that, too, will be a
collision: h(x | y) = h(x′ | y).
In 2004, Joux [56] analyzed the extension of this case; by taking the result
h(x) = h(x′) as the starting point, we may find another pair y, y′, and by doubling
the effort we have four “real” collisions:
h(x | y) = h(x′ | y) = h(x | y′) = h(x′ | y′). (2.10)
Such tuplets are called multicollisions. As the size of the multicollision grows in
powers of 2, the cost of finding a k-multicollision is O(ln k × 2m/2).
The idea of the Joux multicollision attack has been extended by Kelsey and
Kohno into a herding attack [58]. A herding attack allows an attacker to commit
to the hash of a message that she does not yet fully know, at the cost of a large
computation. Similar techniques have been developed to find second preimages in
less than O(2m) work [59].
The fundamental countermeasure against multicollisions and herding attacks is
to make finding collisions in the compression function more difficult than the overall
security expected of the hash function. The only way of achieving this is to increase
the state (number of bits transferred between iterations) to be larger than the final
hash output.
2.6 Pseudorandomness
Hash functions are used as basic building blocks in many applications where the
essential requirement is pseudorandomness; if the hash function input is unknown,
the hash should be algorithmically indistinguishable from a pseudorandom function
(PRF) under the assumption that the distinguisher does not itself implement the
hash or a close derivative of the hash. This notion has been formalized by Bellare,
Rogaway, Maurer, et al. as “indistinguishability from a random oracle” [10, 68].
We note that for any iterated hash function we expect a 2n/2 distinguisher to exist,
based on internal collisions.
This vague restriction can be removed in the case of keyed hashes (MACs), where
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no distinguisher should exist that is faster than an exhaustive search for the key.
There are also directly keyed hashes such as the Skein hash function [36]. See [43]
for a discussion of the relationship between “one-wayness” and pseudorandomness.
One of the main applications of hash functions is in Deterministic Random Bit
Generators (DRBGs), which are used to create secret keying information for cryp-
tographic applications. NIST has specified two DRBGs, Hash_DRBG and HMAC_DRBG,
whose security is directly based on the preimage resistance and pseudorandomness
of the underlying hash function [5]. It has been shown that NMAC and HMAC –
keyed hash functions based on an unkeyed iterated hash are PRFs if the underlying
compression function is a PRF [7, 8].
We give a technical definition of a PRF-Adversary and its advantage, following
the convention adopted by Belare and others [8, 41].
Definition 2.6. A PRF-Adversary A against a family of functions f : K×D → R takes
as oracle a function g : D → R and returns a bit. The PRF-advantage of A against f
is the difference between the probability that it outputs 1 when its oracle is g = f(k, ·)
for random key k ∈ K, and the probability that it outputs 1 when its oracle g is chosen
at random from the set of functions mapping D to R. This can be written as
Advprff (A) = Pr[A
f(K,·) = 1]− Pr[Arandom = 1]. (2.11)
The function f is not a PRF if a probabilistic polynomial time adversary exists that has
nonnegligble PRF-advantage.
This definition for pseudorandomness of a keyed hash can be applied to a com-
pression function by regarding the input chaining variable as the secret key.
For a pseudorandom function we would expect that the total effort (including
black-box oracle queries) required to gain a non-negligible advantage should be
equivalent to a brute-force attack against the secret key, which would requireO(|K|)
effort.
2.7 Relationships between different security properties
Intuitively:
- First preimage resistance does not imply second preimage resistance.
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- Compression function collision resistance implies hash function collision resis-
tance (if the entire state is used as output).
We note that the “standard” hash function properties (preimage resistance, sec-
ond preimage resistance and collision resistance) do not directly imply pseudoran-
domness. For further technical discussion about various security notions and their
relationships we refer the reader to Rogaway and Shrimpton [92].
In some sense, collision resistance appears to be the strongest security notion of
the three. But is it?
Theorem 2.4. Collision resistance does not imply first preimage resistance.
Proof. Consider an m + 1-bit hash function h′ that is built on a secure m-bit hash
function h as follows:
h′(x) =
 x | 100 · · · 0 if x has m bits or lessh(x) | 1 if x has more than m bits. (2.12)
The message x is used “as is” for short messages and the rightmost bit is set to zero
(since the identity transform is collision resistant!). For longer messages, the hash
is used and the last bit is set to one. The function h′ is collision resistant if h is.
However, h′ is not preimage resistant for half of its range. Having a redundant bit in
the output causes only a small constant-factor speedup in collision search [70, Note
9.20].
2.8 Further Security Properties of Hash Functions
The focus of this thesis is hash function cryptanalysis; finding flaws in hash functions
that indicate that they do not fulfill some of the properties outlined in this chapter.
We conjecture that it is impossible to prove that a hash function has a given security
property, say, collision-resistance. One can only find algorithms and methods that
demonstrate the lack of security property x, or construct security reductions (proofs
that security property x leads to security property y).
In addition to these traditional forms of attack, we finally note that there are
implementation attacks that focus on the actual physical or logical embodiment of
a hash function. The most notable are timing attacks [62], and differential power
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analysis [63], which utilize the timing and power consumption side channels to
derive secret information about an implementation. Side channels may also be in-
troduced through implementation faults [14, 18]. Side channel attacks are relevant
in sign-and-encrypt schemes and also when MAC secrets are computed.
Such attacks are not considered in the present work.
CHAPTER 3
SYNDROME BASED HASHES
In MyCrypt 2005, Augot, Finiasz, and Sendrier proposed FSB, a family of crypto-
graphic hash functions [4]. The security claim of the FSB hashes is based on a
coding theory problem with hard average-case complexity.
In the ECRYPT 2007 Hash Function Workshop, new versions with essentially
the same compression function, but radically different security parameters and an
additional final transformation, were presented [38]. We show that hardness of
average-case complexity of the underlying problem is irrelevant in collision search
by presenting a linearization method that can be used to produce collisions in a
matter of seconds on a desktop PC for the variant of FSB with claimed 2128 security.
This work was published in the INDOCRYPT 2007 conference [100].
As a response to attacks described here, the security parameters of FSB were
changed once more. A variant of FSB was submitted as a SHA-3 candidate [3], but
was rejected from the second round. The attacks described in this chapter do not
directly apply to that version.
3.1 Introduction
A number of hash functions have been proposed that are based on “hard problems”
from various branches of computer science. Recent proposals in this genre of hash
function design include VSH (see Chapter 6), LASH (see Chapter 8), and the topic of
this chapter, Fast Syndrome Based Hash (FSB), which is based on decoding problems
in the theory of error-correcting codes [4, 38].
In comparison to dedicated hash functions designed using symmetric cryptanal-
ysis techniques, “provably secure” hash functions tend to be relatively slow and do
not always meet all of the criteria traditionally expected of cryptographic hashes.
An example of this is VSH, where only collision resistance is claimed, leaving the
30
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hash function open to various attacks. The SHA-3 first round candidate ECOH [19]
is an another example of this phenomenon.
Another feature of “provably secure” cryptographic primitives is that the proof is
often a reduction to a problem with asymptotically hard worst-case or average-case
complexity, such as the Knapsack problem [71] or Lattice problem [1]. Worst-case
complexity measures the difficulty of solving pathological cases rather than typical
cases of the underlying problem. Even a reduction to a problem with hard average
complexity, as is the case with FSB, offers only limited security assurance as there
can still be an algorithm that easily solves the problem for a subset of the problem
space. This common pitfall of provably secure cryptographic primitives is clearly
demonstrated in this chapter for FSB, where it is shown that the hash function
offers minimal preimage or collision resistance when the message space is chosen
in a specific way.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 describes
the FSB compression function. Section 3.3 gives the basic linearization method for
finding preimages and extends it to “alphabets”. This is followed by an improved
collision attack in Section 3.4 and discussion of attacks based on larger alphabets
in Section 3.5. Section 3.6 gives a concrete example of preimage and collision
attacks on a proposed variant of FSB with claimed 128-bit security. The findings are
concluded in Section 3.7
3.2 The FSB Compression Function
In this chapter all vectors are column vectors unless otherwise stated. The FSB
compression function can be described as follows [4, 38].
Definition 3.1 (FSB Compression Function). Let H be an r × n binary matrix. The
FSB compression function is a mapping from a message vector s = [s1, s2, . . . , sw]
containing w characters, each satisfying 0 ≤ si < nw , to an r bit result as follows:
FSB(s) =
w⊕
i=1
H(i−1) n
w
+si+1 , (3.1)
where Hi denotes column i of the matrix.
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The exact details of padding and chaining of internal state across compression
function iterations were not specified in [4, 38].
An ambiguous definition of an algorithm makes experimental cryptanalytic work
dependent on some assumptions and guesswork. However, the attacks outlined
in this chapter should work, regardless of the particular details of chaining and
padding.
With most proposed variants of FSB, the character size nw is chosen to be 2
8, so
that s can be treated as an array of bytes for practical implementation purposes. See
Section 3.6 for an implementation example.
For the purposes of this chapter, we shall concentrate on finding collisions and
preimages in the compression function. These techniques can easily be applied for
finding full collisions of the hash function. The choice of H is taken to be a random
binary matrix in this chapter, although quasi-cyclic matrices are considered in [38]
to reduce memory usage.
The final transformation proposed in [38] does not affect the complexity of find-
ing collisions or second preimages, although it makes first preimage search difficult
(equivalent to inverting Whirlpool [87]). Second preimages can easily be found
despite a strong final transform.
The authors of FSB claim that the security of this primitive is related to the
Syndrome decoding problem. However, the security parameter selection in the cur-
rent versions of FSB is based primarily on Wagner’s generalized birthday attack
[27, 110]. The security claims are summarized in Table 3.1.
3.3 Linearization Attack
To illustrate our main attack technique, we shall first consider hashes of messages
with binary values in each character: si ∈ {0, 1} for 1 ≤ i ≤ w. This message space
is a small subset of all possible message blocks.
We define a constant vector c,
c =
w⊕
i=1
H(i−1) n
w
+1, (3.2)
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Table 3.1: Parameterizations of FSB, as given in [38]. Line 6 (in bold) with claimed
2128 security was proposed for practical use. Preimages and collisions can be found
for this variant in a matter of seconds on a desktop PC.
Security r w n n/w
64-bit 512 512 131072 256
512 450 230400 512
1024 217 225 256
80-bit 512 170 43520 256
512 144 73728 512
128-bit 1024 1024 262144 256
1024 904 462848 512
1024 816 835584 1024
and an auxiliary r × w binary matrix A, whose columns Ai, 1 ≤ i ≤ w are given by
Ai = H(i−1) n
w
+1 ⊕H(i−1) n
w
+2. (3.3)
We see that the XOR operations cancel each other out for messages of this par-
ticular type. The FSB compression function is therefore entirely linear:
FSB(s) = A · s⊕ c. (3.4)
Furthermore, let us consider the case where r = w, and therefore A is a square
matrix. If detA 6= 0, the inverse of A exists and we are able to find a preimage s
from the hash h = FSB(s) simply as:
s = A−1 · (h⊕ c). (3.5)
If r is greater than w, the technique can still be applied to force a given w-bit
section of the final hash to some predefined value. Since the order of the rows is not
relevant, we can construct a matrix that contains only the given w rows (i.e. bits of
the hash function result) of A that we are are interested in.
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3.3.1 The Selection of Alphabet in a Preimage Attack
We note that the selection of {0, 1} as the set of allowable message characters (“the
alphabet”) is arbitrary. We can simply choose any pair of values for each i so that
si ∈ {xi, yi} and map each xi 7→ 0 and yi 7→ 1, thus creating a binary vector for the
attack. The constant is then given by:
c =
w⊕
i=1
H(i−1) n
w
+xi , (3.6)
and columns of the A matrix are given by:
Ai = H(i−1) n
w
+xi+1 ⊕H(i−1) nw+yi+1. (3.7)
To invert a hash h we first compute:
b = A−1(h⊕ c), (3.8)
and then apply the mapping si = xi + bi(yi − xi) on the binary result b to obtain a
message s that satisfies FSB(s) = h.
3.3.2 Invertibility of Random Binary Matrices
The binary matrices created by linearization techniques in the previous section are
essentially random for each arbitrarily chosen alphabet. The success of a preimage
attack depends upon the invertibility of the binary matrix A.
Theorem 3.1 (Invertibility of Binary Square Matrices). The probability that an n×n
random binary matrix has non-zero determinant (and is therefore invertible) in GF(2)
is:
p =
n∏
i=1
(1− 2−i). (3.9)
Proof. Consider the Gaussian elimination method for solving linear equations. Gaus-
sian elimination produces an upper triangular matrix in row echelon form by pro-
ceeding from first row (i = 1) to the last (i = n). Elimination at row i is successful if
and only if for some j ≥ i there is a nonzero element Mj,i. For a random matrix, the
probability that these n − i + 1 elements in GF(2) are all zero is 1
2n−i−1 , and hence
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the probability for success at row i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, is 1− 1
2n−i−1 . The product probability
of these independent events can be simplified to p =
∏n
i=1(1− 2−i).
For large n, p approaches the constant 0.288788 . . . or 2−1.79191.... Two trials with
two distinct alphabets are on average enough to find an invertible matrix (the total
probability for 2 trials is 1− (1− p)2 ≈ 0.49418).
3.4 Finding Collisions When r = 2w
We shall expand our approach for producing collisions in 2w bits of the hash function
result by controlling w message characters. This is twice the number compared to
the preimage attack of Section 3.3. The complexity of the attack remains negligible,
being a few simple matrix operations.
By selection of two distinct alphabets, {xi, yi} and {x′i, y′i}, we have two distinct
linear presentations for FSB, one containing the matrix A and constant c and the
other one A′ and c′. We can now work using the tools of linear algebra in GF(2). To
find a pair of messages s, s′ that produces a collision we must find a solution for b
and b′ in the equation:
A · b⊕ c = A′ · b′ ⊕ c′. (3.10)
This basic collision equation can be manipulated to the form:
(
A | A′) ·
 b
b′
 =
 c
c′
 . (3.11)
The solution of the inverse (A | A′)−1 will allow us to compute the message pair
(b | b′)T that yields the same hash in 2w different message bits (since r = 2w yields
a square matrix in this case):
(A | A′)−1 ·
 c
c′
 =
 b
b′
 . (3.12)
The binary vector (b | b′)T can then be split into two messages s and s′ that produce
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the collision. For 1 ≤ i ≤ w we apply the alphabet mapping as follows:
si = xi + bi(yi − xi),
s′i = x′i + b
′
i(y′i − x′i).
Here xi, yi and x′i, y
′
i represent the alphabets for si and s
′
i, respectively.
3.5 Larger Alphabets
Consider an alphabet of cardinality three, {xi, yi, zi}. We can construct a linear
equation in GF(2) that computes the FSB compression function in this message space
by using two columns for each message character si. The linear matrix therefore has
size r × 2w. The constant c is computed as:
c =
w⊕
i=1
H(i−1) n
w
+xi , (3.13)
and the odd and even columns are given by:
A2i−1 = H(i−1) n
w
+xi+1 ⊕H(i−1) nw+yi+1,
A2i = H(i−1) n
w
+xi+1 ⊕H(i−1) nw+zi+1.
The message s must also be transformed into a binary vector b of length 2w via the
selection function v:
si v(si)
xi (0, 0)
yi (1, 0)
zi (0, 1)
The binary vector b is constructed by concatenating the selection function outputs:
b = (v(s1) | v(s2) | · · · |v(sw))T . (3.14)
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We again arrive at a simple linear equation for the FSB compression function:
FSB(s) = A · b⊕ c. (3.15)
The main difference is that the message space is much larger, 3w ≈ 21.585w.
This construction is easy to generalize for alphabets of any size: an r × (k −
1)w size linear matrix is required for an alphabet of size k. We have not found
cryptanalytic advantages in mapping hashes back to message spaces with alphabets
larger than three. The probability of missing the alphabet and producing invalid
collisions grows too large. With alphabet of size four, the probability of obtaining
one of the four valid vectors (0, 0, 0), (1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0) or (0, 0, 1) for each w is only
1
2w , making it slower than a brute force approach.
3.5.1 Preimage Search
It is easy to see that even ifA is invertible, not all hash results are, since the solution
of b may contain v(si) = (1, 1) pairs. These do not map back to the message space
in the selection function.
Given a random binary b, the fraction of valid messages in the message space
(alphabet of size three) is given by (3/4)w = 2−0.415w. Despite this disadvantage,
larger alphabets can be useful in attacks. We will illustrate this with an example.
Example 3.1. FSB parameters w = 64, n = 256× 64 = 16384 and r = 128 are being
used; 64 input bytes are processed into a 128-bit result. What is the complexity of a
preimage attack ?
Solution. We will use an alphabet of size three. Considering both matrix invertibil-
ity (Section 3.3.2) and the alphabet mapping, the probability of successfully map-
ping the hash back to the alphabet is 0.28879×(3/4)64 = 2−28.4. We can precompute
227 inverses A−1 for various message spaces offline, hence speeding up the time re-
quired to find an individual preimage. There are also early-abort strategies that
can be used to speed up the search. For example, one can abort immediately if a
preimage symbol which is not in the alphabet is found.
Using these techniques, the preimage search requires roughly 228 steps in this
case, compared to the theoretical 2128.
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Note that the complexity of a collision attack in this case is negligible, as r = 2w
and the technique from Section 3.4 can be used.
3.5.2 Collision Search
Three-character alphabets can be used in conjunction with the collision attack out-
lined in Section 3.4. It is easy to see that it is possible to mix three-character
alphabets with binary alphabets. Each character position si that is mapped to a
three-character alphabet requires two columns in the linear matrix, whereas those
mapped to a binary alphabet require only one column.
Generally speaking, the probability for finding two valid messages in each trial
is (3/4)2k = 2−0.830k when k characters in s and s′ are mapped to three-character
alphabets.
Example 3.2. FSB parameters w = 170, n = 256 × 170 = 43520 and r = 512 are
being used; 170 input bytes are processed into a 512-bit result. What is the complexity
of collision search ? 1
Solution. We use a mixed alphabet; k = 86 characters are mapped to a three-
character alphabet and the remaining 84 characters are mapped to a binary alpha-
bet. The linear matrix A therefore has 2×86+84 = 256 columns, and the combined
matrix
(
A | A′) in the collision attack (similarly to that in Section 3.4) has size
512× 512. The probability of successful matrix inversion is 2−1.792. The probability
of success in each trial is 2−0.830k−1.792 = 2−73.2, so collision search has complexity
roughly equivalent to 273 matrix inversions.
3.6 A Collision and Preimage Example
In this section we define an instantiation of FSB with security parameters proposed
for practical use by its authors in [38]. We then provide a numerical example of
collisions and preimages for this FSB instantiation.
For parameter selection r = 1024, w = 1024, n = 262144, s = 8192, n/w = 256,
the FSB compression function can be implemented in C as follows.
1These security parameters are proposed for 80-bit security in [38] and reproduced in Table 3.1.
CHAPTER 3. SYNDROME BASED HASHES 39
typedef unsigned char u8; // u8 = single byte
typedef unsigned long long u64; // u64 = 64-bit word
void fsb(u64 h[0x40000][0x10], // "random" matrix
u8 s[0x400], // 1k message block
u64 r[0x10]) // result
{
int i, j, idx;
for (i = 0; i < 0x10; i++) // zeroise result
r[i] = 0;
for (i = 0; i < 0x400; i++) // process a block
{
idx = (i << 8) + s[i]; // index in H
for (j = 0; j < 0x10; j++)
r[j] ^= h[idx][j]; // xor over result
}
}
Since the FSB specification does not offer any standard way of defining the “random”
matrix H (or h[][] above), we will do so here using the Data Encryption Standard.
Each 64-bit word h[i][j] is created by encrypting the 64-bit input value 24i ⊕ j
under an all-zero 56-bit key (00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00). The input and output
values are handled in big-endian fashion (most significant byte first).
We note that this selection of DES and an all-zero key is not cryptographically
secure and was only chosen as a means of example so that the experiment can be
independently verified.
Some of the values are: 2
Input to DES Table Index Value
0x0000000000000000 h[0x00000][0x0] = 0x8CA64DE9C1B123A7
0x0000000000000001 h[0x00000][0x1] = 0x166B40B44ABA4BD6
0x0000000000000002 h[0x00000][0x2] = 0x06E7EA22CE92708F
....
2Note that x86 platforms are little-endian. Bi-endian gcc source code for producing preimages can
be downloaded from: http://www.m-js.com/misc/fsb test.tar.gz
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0x0000000000000010 h[0x00001][0x0] = 0x5B711BC4CEEBF2EE
0x0000000000000011 h[0x00001][0x1] = 0x799A09FB40DF6019
0x0000000000000012 h[0x00001][0x2] = 0xAFFA05C77CBE3C45
....
0x00000000003FFFFD h[0x3FFFF][0xD] = 0x313C4BDBE2F7156A
0x00000000003FFFFE h[0x3FFFF][0xE] = 0x19F32D6B2D9B57F5
0x00000000003FFFFF h[0x3FFFF][0xF] = 0x804DB568319F4F8B .
We define two 1024-byte message blocks that produce the same 1024-bit chosen
output value in the FSB compression function, hence demonstrating the ease of
preimage and collision search on a variant with claimed 2128 security. They were
found in less than one second on an iBook G4 laptop.
The first message block uses the ASCII alphabet {A, C} or {0x41, 0x42}:
CAACACACCACAACACACACCACAACCCCCCACCAACACCAAACAAACACCAACACCACACCAA
ACACACCCCCAACCCAAAAAACCCACCACCCACCAAACACACCCCCCAACCACACCCAACACCA
AACCCACCCCCAACCCAAACAAAAACCCACAAAACACACCACCACCCCCACAACCCCACACAAA
AACCCCACCCCAACAACAAAAACAAAACCACACACACACCCCCAAACCCCCAAAAACCCACAAC
CAAACAACCCAAACACCAACCCCACACCCCAAAACCCAAAAAACACAAACCCCAACAAAACCAA
ACACCCCCCCCCAACAAAAACACCCACCCAACAAAAAAACACACCCCCCCAACCCACCCCAACA
AAAACCAACAACACCACCCCACCCCCACCACAAACACCCACCACCCAACCCCACCCAACAAAAC
ACCACCCCAACCCACAACCACCCAACACCAACACCAAAACACACCAAAACACCCAACACACCCC
CAAACACACACCACCACCACCCAAAAAAACCACACACCCCAAAAAAACCCAAACCACCACCCCA
CACAAACCCCAACCCAACCCAACCAACCACCAAAACCCAACCCCCAAAAAACAACCAAACCCCA
AACACCCACAAACACCACCACAACAAAAACCAAACCCAAAAACCCACCACACCCACACACAAAA
CCACCCCAACCCCCAACAACCCCACACAACACAAACCACCCAACCCCAACCACAAAAACCCACC
ACAACCCAAACACACCCCAACAAACCAAACCCCACACCCAAAACCCCACACCACACACAAACAC
CACCCAAAAAACAACAACCACACACAACAAACCAAACAAAAAAAAAACCAAAAAACCCCCAACC
CACCCACCCACAAACAAAACCAAAAAAAACCCAAAAAAACCCAAAACCACAACCACCCCAACCA
CCCACCAAACAACAACCACACAAAAACACCCCACACCCCCCCACCAACACAAAACCAAAAACCA .
The second message block uses ASCII alphabet {A, H} or {0x41, 0x48}:
AHHHHAAAAAHAAAHAHAAAHAHHAHHAAHAAHHAHHHAAAAAHHAAHHHAHAHAAHAAAHHAA
AAAAHAHHAAAHAHHAHAAAHAAHAHAAAAHHHHHHHAAHAHAAAAAHAHHHHHAAHHHHAHAH
AAHAAAHAHAHHHHHAHHAHAHAAAHAHAAHAHHAAAAHAAHAAAHAAHHHHHAHAAHHAAHAH
HHAHAAHHHAAHAAAHHHHAHHHHAAHAAHAAAAAHAAHHAAAHAAHHHAAHAHAHHHAHAAHA
AHHAAAHHAAAAAHHAHAAAAAHAHAHHAHHAHAAHHAHAHAAHHHHAAHAHHHAAHHAHAAHH
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The 1024-bit / 128-byte result of compressing either one of these blocks is:
Index Hex ASCII
00000000 5468697320697320 6120636f6c6c6973 |This is a collis|
00000010 696f6e20616e6420 7072652d696d6167 |ion and pre-imag|
00000020 6520666f72204661 73742053796e6472 |e for Fast Syndr|
00000030 6f6d652042617365 6420486173682e20 |ome Based Hash. |
00000040 4172626974726172 79207072652d696d |Arbitrary pre-im|
00000050 616765732063616e 20626520666f756e |ages can be foun|
00000060 6420696e20612066 72616374696f6e20 |d in a fraction |
00000070 6f66206120736563 6f6e642120202020 |of a second! | .
3.7 Conclusions
We have shown that Fast Syndrome Based Hashes (FSB) as described in [4, 38]
are not secure against preimage or collision attacks under the proposed security
parameters. The attacks have been implemented and collisions for a variant with
claimed 128-bit security can be found in less than one second on a low-end PC.
We feel that the claim of “provable security” is hollow in the case of FSB, where
the security proof is based on a problem with hard average-case complexity, but
which is almost trivially solvable for special classes of messages.
CHAPTER 4
COLLISION SEARCH IN FORK-256
We show that a 2112.8 collision attack exists against the FORK-256 Hash Function
[53, 54]. The attack is surprisingly simple compared to existing published FORK-
256 cryptanalysis work [66, 67, 69], yet is the best known result against the new,
tweaked version of the hash. The attack is based on “splitting” the message schedule
and compression function into two halves in a meet-in-the-middle attack. This in
turn reduces the space of possible hash function results, which leads to significantly
faster collision search. The attack strategy is also applicable to the original version
of FORK-256 published in FSE 2006. This work was published in the INDOCRYPT
2007 conference [101].
4.1 Introduction
FORK-256 is a dedicated hash function that produces a 256-bit hash result from a
message of arbitrary size. The original version of FORK-256 was presented in the
first NIST hash workshop and at FSE 2006 [53]. Several attacks have been outlined
against this original version, namely:
- Matusiewicz, Contini, and Pieprzyk attacked FORK-256 by using the fact that
the functions f and g in the step function were not bijective in the original
version. They used “microcollisions” (partial internal collisions) to find colli-
sions of 2-branch FORK-256 and collisions of full FORK-256 with complexity
of 2126.6 in [66].
- Independently, Mendel, Lano, and Preneel published the collision-finding at-
tack on 2-branch FORK-256 using microcollisions and raised the possibility of
its expansion [69].
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- At FSE 2007 [67] and ICICS 2007 [24], Matusiewicz et al. published the result
of [66] and another attack which finds a collision with complexity of 2108 and
memory of 264.
In response to these attacks the authors of FORK-256 proposed in 2007 a new,
tweaked version of FORK-256 [54], which is supposedly resistant to all before-
mentioned attacks. We will present a simple attack, which is the best currently
known against the new version of FORK-256, and also applicable to the previous
version.
The plan of the rest of this chapter is follows. We first describe the latest vari-
ant of FORK-256 in Section 4.2, which is followed by our key observations in Sec-
tion 4.3. Section 4.4 contains the main attack against FORK-256. We discuss further
work in Section 4.5 and conclude in Section 4.6.
CV i−1
CV i
Branch
1
Branch
2
Branch
3
Branch
4
Figure 4.1: Overall structure of four branches of FORK-256.
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Table 4.1: Initialization Vector.
CV 0[0] = 0x6a09e667 CV 0[1] = 0xbb67ae85
CV 0[2] = 0x3c6ef372 CV 0[3] = 0xa54ff53a
CV 0[4] = 0x510e527f CV 0[5] = 0x9b05688c
CV 0[6] = 0x1f83d9ab CV 0[7] = 0x5be0cd19
Table 4.2: Round constants.
δ[0] = 0x428a2f98 δ[1] = 0x71374491
δ[2] = 0xb5c0fbcf δ[3] = 0xe9b5dba5
δ[4] = 0x3956c25b δ[5] = 0x59f111f1
δ[6] = 0x923f82a4 δ[7] = 0xab1c5ed5
δ[8] = 0xd807aa98 δ[9] = 0x12835b01
δ[10] = 0x243185be δ[11] = 0x550c7dc3
δ[12] = 0x72be5d74 δ[13] = 0x80deb1fe
δ[14] = 0x9bdc06a7 δ[15] = 0xc19bf174
4.2 Description of New FORK-256
New FORK-256 (hereafter FORK-256) is an iterated hash function with a 256-bit (8-
word) internal state and a 512-bit (16-word) message block. Padding and chaining
details are similar to those of the SHA and the MD families of hash functions [79,
88, 89].
FORK-256 is entirely built on shift, exclusive-or, and addition operations on 32-
bit words. The compression function of FORK-256 consists of four independent
“branches”. Each one of these branches takes in the 256-bit (8-word) chaining
value and a 512-bit (16-word) message block to produce a 256-bit result. These
four branch results are combined with the chaining value to produce the final com-
pression function result.
Figure 4.1 illustrates the branch structure. Note that the lines in the picture
are 256 bits wide; the addition symbols represent eight 32-bit modular additions in
parallel.
The four branches are structurally equivalent, but differ in scheduling of the
message words and round constants. Each branch is computed in eight steps, 0 ≤
s ≤ 7. Each step utilizes two message words and two round constants.
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Table 4.3: Round constant schedule.
Step Branch 1 Branch 2 Branch 3 Branch 4
s α
(s)
1 β
(s)
1 α
(s)
2 β
(s)
2 α
(s)
3 β
(s)
3 α
(s)
4 β
(s)
4
0 δ[0] δ[1] δ[15] δ[14] δ[1] δ[0] δ[14] δ[15]
1 δ[2] δ[3] δ[13] δ[12] δ[3] δ[2] δ[12] δ[13]
2 δ[4] δ[5] δ[11] δ[10] δ[5] δ[4] δ[10] δ[11]
3 δ[6] δ[7] δ[9] δ[8] δ[7] δ[6] δ[8] δ[9]
4 δ[8] δ[9] δ[7] δ[6] δ[9] δ[8] δ[6] δ[7]
5 δ[10] δ[11] δ[5] δ[4] δ[11] δ[10] δ[4] δ[5]
6 δ[12] δ[13] δ[3] δ[2] δ[13] δ[12] δ[2] δ[3]
7 δ[14] δ[15] δ[1] δ[0] δ[15] δ[14] δ[0] δ[1]
The scheduling of the message block words M [0 . . . 15] in each branch is given in
Table 4.4. The round constants δ[0 . . . 15] are given in Table 4.2 and their schedule
in Table 4.3. The original description uses auxiliary tables σ and ρ; for convenience
we use a (“left word”), b (“right word”), α (“left constant”), and β (“right constant”)
in this description as follows:
a
(s)
j = M [σj(2s)],
b
(s)
j = M [σj(2s+ 1)],
α
(s)
j = δ[ρj(2s)],
β
(s)
j = δ[ρj(2s+ 1)].
FORK-256 uses two 32-bit Boolean functions f and g, which were redefined for
the New FORK-256 to avoid microcollisions:
f(x) = x⊕ (x≪ 15)⊕ (x≪ 27),
g(x) = x⊕ ((x≪ 7)¢ (x≪ 25)).
Following the convention of the FORK-256 specification, let CV i[0..7] be the
result of the compression function iteration i and CV 0[0..7] the Initialization Vector
given in Table 4.1.
Each branch j processes eight input words R(0)j [t] = CV i[t] to eight output words
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Table 4.4: Message word schedule for FORK-256. It is easy to observe that in
branch 2 and branch 3, M [1] only affects the result in the last step. M [14] is used in
the last and next-to-last steps in branches 1 and 4, respectively. These observations
are used in the attack.
Step Branch 1 Branch 2 Branch 3 Branch 4
s a
(s)
1 b
(s)
1 a
(s)
2 b
(s)
2 a
(s)
3 b
(s)
3 a
(s)
4 b
(s)
4
0 M [0] M [1] M [14] M [15] M [7] M [6] M [5] M [12]
1 M [2] M [3] M [11] M [9] M [10] M [14] M [1] M [8]
2 M [4] M [5] M [8] M [10] M [13] M [2] M [15] M [0]
3 M [6] M [7] M [3] M [4] M [9] M [12] M [13] M [11]
4 M [8] M [9] M [2] M [13] M [11] M [4] M [3] M [10]
5 M [10] M [11] M [0] M [5] M [15] M [8] M [9] M [2]
6 M [12] M [13] M [6] M [7] M [5] M [0] M [7] M [14]
7 M [14] M [15] M [12] M [1] M [1] M [3] M [4] M [6]
R
(8)
j [t], 0 ≤ t ≤ 7. Figure 4.2 illustrates the step function. For 0 ≤ s ≤ 7:
t1 = f(R
(s)
j [0]¢ a
(s)
j ),
t2 = g(R
(s)
j [0]¢ a
(s)
j ¢ α
(s)
j ),
t3 = g(R
(s)
j [4]¢ b
(s)
j ),
t4 = f(R
(s)
j [4]¢ b
(s)
j ¢ β
(s)
j ),
R
(s+1)
j [0] = R
(s)
j [7]⊕ (t4 ≪ 8),
R
(s+1)
j [1] = R
(s)
j [0]¢ a
(s)
j ¢ α
(s)
j ,
R
(s+1)
j [2] = R
(s)
j [1]¢ t1,
R
(s+1)
j [3] = (R
(s)
j [2]¢ (t1 ≪ 13))⊕ t2,
R
(s+1)
j [4] = R
(s)
j [3]⊕ (t2 ≪ 17),
R
(s+1)
j [5] = R
(s)
j [4]¢ b
(s)
j ¢ β
(s)
j ,
R
(s+1)
j [6] = R
(s)
j [5]¢ t3,
R
(s+1)
j [7] = (R
(s)
j [6]¢ (t3 ≪ 3))⊕ t4.
CHAPTER 4. COLLISION SEARCH IN FORK-256 47
The final result of the compression function for each word 0 ≤ t ≤ 7 is:
CV i+1[t] = CV i[t]¢ ((R(8)1 t¢R
(8)
2 [t])⊕ (R(8)3 [t]¢R(8)4 [t])). (4.1)
If i is the final iteration, CV i+1 is the final hash value.
4.3 Observations
Each branch of the compression function uses each message wordM [0 . . . 15] exactly
once. Due to the diffusion properties of the step function, message words that are
scheduled for the last steps do not affect all output words.
Consider the sixth output word of each branch, R(8)j [5]. The last step is defined
as:
R
(8)
j [5] = R
(7)
j [4]¢ b
(7)
j ¢ β
(7)
j . (4.2)
Furthermore we “open up” R(7)j [4] in the previous step:
R
(7)
j [4] = R
(6)
j [3]⊕ (g(R(6)j [0]¢ a(6)j ¢ β(6)j )≪ 17). (4.3)
Ignoring the round constants α(s)j and β
(s)
j , we can observe that the only message
words in steps 6 and 7 affecting R(8)j [5] are a
(6)
j and b
(7)
j , the latter having a linear
R
(s)
j [0]
R
(s+1)
j [1]
R
(s)
j [1]
R
(s+1)
j [2]
R
(s)
j [2]
R
(s+1)
j [3]
R
(s)
j [3]
R
(s+1)
j [4]
R
(s)
j [4]
R
(s+1)
j [5]
R
(s)
j [5]
R
(s+1)
j [6]
R
(s)
j [6]
R
(s+1)
j [7]
R
(s)
j [7]
R
(s+1)
j [0]
a
(s)
j
f
≪13
α
(s)
j
g
≪17
b
(s)
j
g
≪ 3
β
(s)
j
f
≪ 8
Figure 4.2: The new FORK-256 step iteration.
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effect. Constants b(6)j and a
(7)
j have no effect on the computation of this word.
Thus by inspecting the step function and the message word schedule in Table 4.4,
it is easy to verify that Rj [5] satisfies the following properties:
Branch 1: R(8)1 [5] is independent of M [14] = a
(7)
1 ;
Branch 2: R(8)2 [5] is linearly dependent on M [1] = b
(7)
2 ;
Branch 3: R(8)3 [5] is independent of M [1] = a
(7)
3 ;
Branch 4: R(8)4 [5] is independent of M [14] = b
(6)
4 .
We shall use these simple observations to construct an attack against FORK-256.
We note that due to the fact that the message word schedule is shared between
the old and new versions of FORK-256, the same four observations (and the same
general attack) apply to both versions, although there are important technical dif-
ferences between the old and the new version. The complexity of the attack is the
same for both.
4.4 A Collision Attack
The main strategy of the attack is to use a fast method for finding messages that hash
into a significantly smaller subset of possible hash values. We do this by forcing the
sixth word of the compression function to remain constant over the hash function
iteration, CV 1[5] = CV 0[5], thereby generating hash values in a subset of size 2224.
Assuming uniform distribution, a full collision can be expected after
√
2 ln 2 ×
2
224
2 ≈ 2112.2 hashes in the small subset have been found. This follows from Theorem
2.2 (The Birthday Theorem).
The value of CV 1[5] is combined from the four branches and the initialization
vector as follows:
CV 1[5] = CV 0[5]¢ ((R(8)1 [5]¢R
(8)
2 [5])⊕ (R(8)3 [5]¢R(8)4 [5])). (4.4)
By substituting CV 1[5] = CV 0[5] and regrouping branches 2 and 3 on the left
side and branches 1 and 4 on the right side, we obtain the following necessary and
sufficient condition for CV 1[5] = CV 0[5]:
R
(8)
2 [5]¯R
(8)
3 [5] = R
(8)
1 [5]¯R
(8)
4 [5]. (4.5)
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Our attack is based on choosing two message words M [1] and M [14] in a specific
way to satisfy CV 1[5] = CV 0[5], which is possible due to the observations given in
the previous section. The values of the fourteen other message words are arbitrary
and can be chosen at random (as long as they remain constant through the two
phases of the attack). The two phases can be repeated any number of times to
produce sufficient hashes in the subset.
4.4.1 First Phase
Set M [1] = 0 and loop over M [14] = 0, 1, 2, · · · , 232 − 1. Compute branches 2 and 3
for each M [14] to obtain x = R(8)2 [5]¯R
(8)
3 [5]. Place x and M [14] into a look-up table
so that the value of M [14] can be immediately retrieved based on the corresponding
x value (i.e. M [14] is indexed by x).
Note that since the mapping from M [14] to x is not surjective, about 1/e ≈ 36.8%
of the values of x will never occur (when the mapping is modeled as a random
function). This follows from the following classical theorem:
Theorem 4.1 (Range of a Random Function). The range of a discrete random func-
tion f : S 7→ S approaches (1− e−1) |S| when |S| approaches infinity.
Proof. The probability that any given element x ∈ S does not map to a given ele-
ment y ∈ S is 1− 1|S| . The product probability that no x maps to y is therefore:
p =
∏
x∈S
(
1− 1|S|
)
. (4.6)
We obtain the result by applying the classic Bernoulli limit:
1
e
= lim
n→∞
(
1− 1
n
)n
, (4.7)
and multiplying the inverse probability 1− p with the cardinality of S.
On the other hand, many x can be obtained with more than one value of M [14].
Using a straightforward lookup cannot handle the latter situation, but simple data
structures with negligible expansion exist that can be used for these cases. The table
does not need to be larger than 16 gigabytes (32 bits ×232 entries).
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4.4.2 Second Phase
Loop over the 232 values of M [1]. Compute branches 1 and 4 for each M [1] to obtain
y = R(8)1 [5]¯R
(8)
4 [5]¢M [1]. The M [1] term is included due to the linear dependence
of R(8)2 [5] on it (this is also why M [1] is set to zero in the first phase).
In each step, perform a look-up. If any matches x = y are found, the necessary
and sufficient condition is satisfied and we have found a message (or rather, a pair
of M [1] and M [14] values) that produces one or more hashes that satisfy CV 1[5] =
CV 0[5].
4.4.3 Runtime Analysis
Each loop step in the second phase produces one match in the lookup table on
average. This is due to the fact that even though the mapping is not surjective,
there are a total of 232 M [14] entries in the table. Hence, approximately 232 hashes
with the property are produced in the second phase.
Since computation of only two branches out of four are needed, the computa-
tional effort in the first and second phases is roughly equivalent to 231 full hash
computations each, or 232 in total. If the full eight words in phase 1 are not stored,
branches 2 and 3 need to be computed again to reproduce a full hash, bringing the
total number to 3 ∗ 231. The average cost of producing a hash in the 2224 subset is
therefore 32 hash function invocations.
Unfortunately we have been unable to come up with a method utilizing “mem-
oryless” random-walk collision search methods such as those discussed in [108].
This is due to the fact that the algorithm outlined above only works in “batches”
of 232 to obtain a favorable average cost for each hash with the desired property
CV 1[5] = CV 0[5]. The memory requirement is therefore equivalent to running time
requirement, namely 32
√
2 ln 2× 2 2242 = 2112.8.
4.5 Further Work
The same observations about the effects of M [1] and M [14] on the final hash can
easily be adopted into a preimage attack that recovers the values of these two mes-
sage words with 232 effort, rather than 264, as expected in a brute-force search.
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It may be possible to “fix” more than 32 bits by using additional words of keying
material besides M [1] and M [14] in the attack. This would naturally lead to a more
effective overall collision attack. Terms M [0] and M [5] appear to be good candidates
as they are only used in steps 5 and 6 of branches 2 and 3, respectively, and are
therefore not fully diffused at the end of step 7.
We feel that in order to secure FORK-256, more rounds are needed. The design-
ers of FORK-256 did not go this route, but designed an altogether new hash func-
tion for the SHA-3 competition. The ARIRANG hash function [20] was subsequently
cryptanalysed and did not make it to the second round of the SHA-3 competition
[46, 55].
4.6 Conclusion
We have presented a 2112.8 collision attack against the new, improved version of the
hash function FORK-256. This represents a speed improvement of factor 215.2 over a
straightforward collision search. The attack strategy is surprisingly simple, and can
also be applied against the original version of FORK-256 in slightly modified form.
CHAPTER 5
HASH-BASED BLOCK CIPHERS
In this chapter we cryptanalyse some block cipher proposals that are based on ded-
icated hash functions SHA-1 and MD5. We discuss a related-key attack against
SHACAL-1 and present a method for finding “slid pairs” for it. We also present sim-
ple attacks against MDC-MD5 and the Kaliski-Robshaw Crab block cipher. These
results were partially published in the Fast Software Encryption 2003 conference
[96].
5.1 Introduction
One of the most widely used ways of creating cryptographic hash functions from
block ciphers is the so-called Davies-Meyer mode [85, 116]. Let Y = E(X,M) be a
compression function that takes in a message block M with an input variable X and
produces a result Y of equal size to X. To compute a message digest of message
M1 |M2 | · · · |Mn, we set X0 to some predefined initialization vector and iterate for
i = 1, 2, . . . , n:
Xi = E(Xi−1,Mi)⊕Xi−1. (5.1)
The resulting message digest is Xn. In 2002 Black, Rogaway, and Shrimpton
proved that this mode is secure if E is secure in ideal cipher model [17].
It has been observed [49] that the compression functions of most widely-used
dedicated hash functions MD5 [89] and SHA [77, 79] are based on this construc-
tion. In these hash functions the exclusive-or operation is replaced by wordwise
addition modulo 232 of the chaining variables Xi . It has also been observed that
the compression function E of MD5 and SHA can be efficiently computed in both
directions; given Y = E(X,M) and M , the original chaining value X can be recov-
ered using an inverse transform X = E−1(Y,M). However, it is believed to be more
difficult to recover Xi−1, given Xi and M .
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The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 describes a method
of finding slid pairs in SHACAL, the compression function of SHA-1. Section 5.3 de-
scribes attacks against MDC-MD5 and the Kaliski-Robshaw cipher, two block ciphers
derived from the MD5 hash function. Section 5.4 contains our analysis regarding
the cryptographic strength required from a block cipher when compared to the com-
pression function of a dedicated hash function.
5.2 The SHACAL Block Ciphers
One of the proposals for the NESSIE 1 project was the block cipher SHACAL, which is
essentially the SHA-1 compression function with the Davies-Meyer chaining (adding
the previous chaining value Xi−1) peeled off [49]. In this proposal the message
block M is viewed as the “key”, the chaining variable X acts as the plaintext block
and Y = E(X,M) is the corresponding ciphertext block.
Later, a “tweak” was submitted where the original SHACAL was renamed SHACAL-
1 and a new block cipher SHACAL-2 (based on SHA-256) was proposed [50]. We
refer the reader to [49, 50] for detailed specifications of the SHACAL block ciphers.
The basic structure of the SHA-1 compression structure is also used as a part of the
HORNET stream cipher [75].
Algorithm 5.1 is a full specification of SHACAL-1. The 512-bit key is contained
in sixteen 32-bit words W0,W1, . . . ,W15. The 160-bit plaintext consists of five in-
put words (A,B,C,D,E). The corresponding ciphertext is returned in these same
variables.
A detailed analysis of differential and linear properties of SHACAL-1 can be
found in [48], where it is conjectured that a linear cryptanalytic attack would re-
quire at least 280 known plaintexts and a differential attack would require at least
2116 chosen plaintexts.
5.2.1 Sliding SHA-1 and SHACAL-1
Slide attacks exploit the iterative nature of a block ciphers (or compression func-
tions). Let Ri(X,M) be the state of the block cipher after round i. R0(X,M) = X
1NESSIE (New European Schemes for Signatures, Integrity and Encryption) was a European Union
research project funded from 2000–2003 to identify secure cryptographic primitives.
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Algorithm 5.1 SHACAL-1 (The SHA-1 Compression Function)
for i = 16 . . . 79 do
Wi ← (Wt−3 ⊕Wt−8 ⊕Wt−14 ⊕Wt−16)≪ 1
end for
0..19: first round (“select”).
for i = 0 . . . 19 do
T ← (A≪ 5)¢ ((B ∧ C) ∨ (¬B ∧D))¢E ¢Wi¢ 0x5A827999
E ← D, D ← C, C ← B≪ 30, B ← A, A← T
end for
20..39: second round (“parity”).
for i = 20 . . . 39 do
T ← (A≪ 5)¢ (B ⊕ C ⊕D)¢E ¢Wi¢ 0x6ED9EBA1
E ← D, D ← C, C ← B≪ 30, B ← A, A← T
end for
40..59: third round (“majority”).
for i = 40 . . . 59 do
T ← (A≪ 5)¢ ((B ∧ C) ∨ (B ∧D) ∨ (C ∧D))¢ E ¢Wi¢ 0x8F1BBCDC
E ← D, D ← C, C ← B≪ 30, B ← A, A← T
end for
60..79: fourth round (“parity”).
for i = 60 . . . 79 do
T ← (A≪ 5)¢ (B ⊕ C ⊕D)¢E ¢Wi¢ 0xCA62C1D6
E ← D, D ← C, C ← B≪ 30, B ← A, A← T
end for
is the input value and Rn(X,M) = E(X,M) is the result after all n rounds are
computed.
Definition 5.1 (Slid Pair). A pair of messages M,M ′ that satisfies:
Ri+1(X,M) = Ri(R1(X,M),M ′), (5.2)
for some appropriate input X constitutes a slid pair.
A full slid pair maintains this property through the entire computation (0 ≤ i <
n). In this section we provide an example of such a slid pair for the SHACAL-1 block
cipher and the compression function of SHA-1.
The current terminology for slide attacks against block ciphers was introduced by
Biryukov and Wagner in 1999 [15, 16], although similar techniques had previously
been used by others, including the author of this thesis ([95] discusses “Ladder
attacks”, which are essentially the same as slide attacks). See [45] or [6] (pp. 274–
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267) for a description of the 1977 Grossman-Tuckerman slide attack on the NDS
cipher.
To our knowledge, slide attacks against hash functions have not been considered
in the literature before this work was originally published in 2003 [96]. David
Wagner considered a slide attack on 40 iterations of SHA-1 in unpublished work
[109].
Indeed it is difficult to see if, and how, “slid pairs” in the compression function
can be exploited to find collisions for the hash function. This remains an open
question.
However, it is interesting to consider the question of whether or not slid pairs
(which are essentially linear relations between two inputs and outputs) can be easily
found for SHA-1. This is also related to Anderson’s classification of hash functions
[2], where it is argued that correlation freedom is essential for a cryptographic hash
function. Anderson defines a function h to be correlation free if it is not feasible to
find x and y such that the Hamming distance between h(x) and h(y) is less than
one would expect by random chance with the same number of hash function invo-
cations. A computationally efficient algorithm that finds related keys and messages
in a hash function is a violation of correlation freedom if we understand correlation
in a slightly broader sense.
SHA-1 exhibits some properties which are useful when mounting slide attacks.
Firstly, the SHA-1 compression function consists of four different round types. For
20 iterations of each round, the nonlinear function Fi and the constant Ki are un-
changed. There are only three transitions between different iteration types (see
Figure 5.1). These transitions occur after rounds 20, 40 and 60.
Secondly, the key schedule (i.e. message expansion) can be slid. We simply
choose:
W ′i = Wi+1 for 0 ≤ i ≤ 14; (5.3)
W ′15 = (W1 ⊕W7 ⊕W12 ⊕W15)≪ 1. (5.4)
Since this is an LFSR, we observe that after key expansionW ′i =Wi+1 for 0 ≤ i ≤ 78.
We note that these properties are not exhibited by SHA-256 (or SHA-512), thus
making SHACAL-2 more resistant to slide attacks.
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5.2.2 Linear Relationships in Messages and Hash Results
We now consider the difficulty of distinguishing related keys in a chosen plaintext
attack, where we have access to two SHACAL-1 encryption oracles (“black boxes”)
whose keys are related in the way described in the previous section (Equations 5.3
and 5.4). The main question becomes: how many chosen plaintexts are needed?
For the transition iterations between different types of functions we wish to find
inputs that produce the same output word for both types (“round collisions”). Ex-
periments have confirmed that the round functions behave sufficiently randomly for
us to use 2−32 as the probability of a round collision. Since there are three transi-
tions, a simple distinguisher will require approximately 2128 chosen plaintext pairs.
This can be improved to 296 by using “structures”; first perform 232 encryptions
of (A,B,C,D, x) on the first oracle, where x = 0, 1, 2, · · · , 232 − 1 and A,B,C,D
are some constants. Then do another 232 encryptions of (y,A,B ≫ 2, C,D) on
the second “slid” oracle for y = 0, 1, 2, · · · , 232 − 1. Since each entry in the first
set corresponds to some slid entry in the second set, the first collision is effectively
obtained for free, and only 296 pairs are required to distinguish the related keys 2.
A version of SHACAL-1 reduced to three rounds (60 iterations) will require 264
pairs (only two transitions).
5.2.3 An Algorithm for Finding Slid Pairs
A method exists for finding slid pairs with roughly 232 effort. We only give an
overview of the technique.
The general strategy is as follows. The algorithm does not start by choosing the
plaintext or the ciphertext, but from the “middle” iterations 20 and 40. We find
collisions in these positions with O(1) effort and then work towards iterations 25 –
28, where we perform a partial meet-in-the middle match.
Round Collisions
We note that in iteration i, not all input words affect the possibility of a round
collision; only B, C, and D are relevant, since A and E only affect the output word
2The suggestion of using “structures” came from an anonymous program committee member of
FSE 2003, where this work was originally published [96].
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A B C D E
Repeat 20 times
t = 0 . . . 19 ≫ 2
≪ 5
Select
5A82799916
Wt
Repeat 20 times
t = 20 . . . 39 ≫ 2
≪ 5
6ED9EBA116
Wt
Repeat 20 times
t = 40 . . . 59 ≫ 2
≪ 5
Majority
8F1BBCDC16
Wt
Repeat 20 times
t = 60 . . . 79 ≫ 2
≪ 5
CA62C1D616
Wt
A’ B’ C’ D’ E’
Figure 5.1: SHACAL-1.
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linearly. Furthermore, the key word Wi has no effect on the probability of collision
in iterations i or i+ 1.
For iteration pair 19/20 (select-parity transition) we use:
(B,C,D) = (¯K20,¯K0,¯K0). (5.5)
We observe that:
(B ∧ C) ∨ (¬B ∧D) = ¯K0; (5.6)
B ⊕ C ⊕D = ¯K20. (5.7)
Thus the constant (K0/K20) is canceled out in both cases and a round collision
occurs.
Similarly, for iteration pair 39/40 (parity-majority transition) we use:
(B,C,D) = (¯K20,¯K40,¯K40). (5.8)
Again we see that a collision occurs:
B ⊕ C ⊕D = ¯K20; (5.9)
(B ∧ C) ∨ (C ∧D) ∨ (B ∧D) = ¯K40. (5.10)
Keying
The key-expansion LFSR is sparse. This helps us to stretch the 16-word span of the
key schedule window to cover two collisions at iterations 20 and 40.
We note that all 80 key words can easily be computed from any 16 consecutive
words of the expanded key. In our attack we choose keys W21...36. We start by
forcing a collision at iteration 20 and then running the cipher forward to iteration
25.
We then pick (A,B,C,D,E) after iteration 38 so that a collision occurs at itera-
tion 40, and then run the cipher backwards to iteration 28. Key words W21 . . .W24
CHAPTER 5. HASH-BASED BLOCK CIPHERS 59
and W29 . . .W36 are set to zero. Therefore:
W37 = (W33 ⊕W29 ⊕W23 ⊕W21);≪ 1 = 0 (5.11)
W38 = (W34 ⊕W30 ⊕W24 ⊕W22)≪ 1 = 0. (5.12)
Note that W39 and W40 do not affect the collision at iteration 40.
We can choose four keying words W25...28 without messing up the two round
collisions. Unfortunately we cannot control all five words, so we are forced to use a
large lookup table to find a match for the fifth word of the running state. This works
because SHA-1 requires five iterations before all words are non-linearly changed.
After we have collisions in iterations 20 and 40, and sixteen keying wordsW21...36,
we run the compression function forward to iteration 59/60 and see if a collision
also occurs there. Since two of the three necessary collisions can be found with es-
sentiallyO(1) effort, and the third requiresO(232) operations, the overall complexity
of finding slid pairs is O(232). The method has been implemented; see Section 5.2.4
for an example of a slid pair for the full SHACAL-1.
This is a surprising property, but we have not discovered a direct way to trans-
form it into a practical attack against SHA-1 and SHACAL.
5.2.4 A Slid Pair for SHA-1
The algorithm described in the previous section for finding slid pairs was imple-
mented in the C programming language (588 lines). A test run required roughly
two hours of CPU time on a 1 GHz Pentium III computer (GCC/Linux). The results
have been verified against a reference implementation of SHACAL. The slid pair is
given here as two triplets containing:
1. An input block (A,B,C,D,E) of 160 bits.
2. A key block W0...15 of 512 bits.
3. An output block (A′, B′, C ′, D′, E′) of 160 bits.
The output block (A′, B′, C ′, D′, E′) also includes the final addition of a chaining
variable. If this final “chaining” is removed, this is also a slid pair for SHACAL-1.
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It is easy to see that Triplet B has been slid “right” by one position compared to
Triplet A. The message block has been slid “left” correspondingly.
Triplet A:
(A,B,C,D,E) = 02AAD5C2 DC766713 19C66B2F 7CEAE5B1 CC08CC0B
W0...15 = 8DA3F8F6 BBA5050C 99D3C3DC BBA5050C 99D3C3DC
E42BAFB3 37DF640F 1ABABEEA 8DA3F8F6 E42BAFB3
37DF640F B57DEBB5 5AA5AB1F 44ED8DA0 1B63271F
EAE12A73
(A′, B′, C ′, D′, E′) = FC56BE44 03A42CDA F68056F0 960F5286 32985CD9
Triplet B:
(A,B,C,D,E) = 4258DA7D 02AAD5C2 F71D99C4 19C66B2F 7CEAE5B1
W0...15 = BBA5050C 99D3C3DC BBA5050C 99D3C3DC E42BAFB3
37DF640F 1ABABEEA 8DA3F8F6 E42BAFB3 37DF640F
B57DEBB5 5AA5AB1F 44ED8DA0 1B63271F EAE12A73
BA7C9CF9
(A′, B′, C ′, D′, E′) = 58BB28F0 FC56BE44 C0E90B35 F68056F0 960F5286
5.3 Block ciphers based on MD5
We may also consider block ciphers derived from other dedicated hash functions.
One obvious candidate is MD5 [89]. The MD5 compression function consists of
four “rounds”, each of which has 16 iterations. Because each of the 64 iterations
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has a different constant, the MD5 compression function does not seem to be subject
to slide attacks. Figure 5.2 illustrates the structure of a single MD5 iteration.
A B C D
≪ s
B’
X[k]
T[i]
F
C’ D’A’
Figure 5.2: The MD5 iteration.
Both MD5 and its compression function are known to not be collision-resistant
[35, 113]. We are not aware of any cryptanalysis of the MD5 compression function
in a block cipher role.
Using the techniques of differential cryptanalysis [13], we have found at least
one high-probability differential relationship in the MD5 compression function. If a
pair of input blocks P and P ′ satisfy:
P ⊕ P ′ = 80000000 80000000 80000000 80000000, (5.13)
it follows that with significant probability the corresponding outputs satisfy the same
differential relationship:
E(P,K)⊕ E(P ′,K) = 80000000 80000000 80000000 80000000. (5.14)
With probability 2−16 this relationship (characteristic) will hold for the 16 itera-
tions of rounds 1, 2, and 4. The relationship holds with P = 1 for round 3, yielding
a total probability of 2−16× 2−16× 1× 2−16 = 2−48 over all four rounds. Note that if
the chaining variable is added, the output XOR becomes zero. This attack is closely
related to the collision attacks discussed in [33].
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5.3.1 Message Digest Cipher
The Message Digest Cipher (MDC) encryption mode for iterated hash functions was
proposed by Gutmann in 1993 and is used in his Secure FileSystem software (in
conjunction with the SHA-1 compression function) [47]. MDC can be defined as:
C0 = IV ; (5.15)
Ci = Pi ⊕ (E(Ci−1,K)¢ Ci−1) for i = 1, 2, . . . , n. (5.16)
Here IV is an initialization vector, Pi are the plaintext blocks, and Ci are the corre-
sponding ciphertext blocks. If we ignore the addition operation, MDC is equivalent
to running the compression function in CFB (cipher feedback) mode.
The decryption operation can be written as:
Pi = Ci ⊕ (E(Ci−1,K)¢ Ci−1). (5.17)
This allows us to select the input to the compression function. Using the differential
characteristic described in the previous section, we can distinguish MDC-MD5 from
a “perfect” 128-bit block cipher in CFB mode with about 248 blocks (255 bits) in
a chosen ciphertext attack. The distinguisher works by choosing plaintext pairs
(P1, P ′1) that satisfy:
P1 ⊕ P ′1 = 80000000 80000000 80000000 80000000, (5.18)
and observing the corresponding ciphertext difference C2⊕C ′2 after encryption. The
Hamming weight of the difference is strongly biased towards zero, and confidence
levels after 248 trials are very high.
5.3.2 The Kaliski-Robshaw Cipher
Another proposal based on MD5 is the Kaliski-Robshaw cipher [57], also called
CRAB. The main purpose of this proposal was to activate discussion of very large
block ciphers that can encrypt, say, an entire 1024-byte disk block in a single oper-
ation. This cipher has 8192-bit blocksize and its basic iteration is closely related to
that of MD5. However, the overall structure is radically different.
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We discovered that flipping bit 26 (0x04000000) of one of the 256 plaintext
words will result in equivalence of at least 64 ciphertext words with experimental
probability 0.096 = 2−3.4. This is due to the fact that this particular bit often only
affects three words in the first round. In each of the consequent rounds the number
of affected words can only quadruple, resulting in 3 ∗ 4 ∗ 4 ∗ 4 = 192 affected words
in the end, and leaving 64 words untouched.
This immediately leads to a distinguisher requiring no more than a dozen chosen
plaintext blocks: flip bit 26 in one of the input words and observe the difference in
ciphertext. If 64 of the ciphertext words match, there is an overwhelming probability
that the “black box”is not a random function.
Analysis of key recovery attacks is made a little bit more difficult by the sketchy
nature of the description of the key schedule. If we assume that the key can be
effectively recovered from permutation P, we believe that a key recovery attack will
not require more than 216 chosen plaintext blocks and negligible computational
effort.
5.4 Conclusions
We have presented attacks against block ciphers that have been directly derived
from dedicated hash functions.
Compression functions are only meant to be run in one direction. The secu-
rity properties of compression functions can be different when run in the opposite
direction (“decryption”). Furthermore, a key-scheduling mechanism suitable for a
dedicated hash function may be insufficient for a block cipher.
Based on the evidence at hand, we assert that since the design criteria for com-
pression functions and block ciphers are radically different, even adaptation of a
secure compression function as a block cipher may not be a wise thing to do.
CHAPTER 6
VSH, THE VERY SMOOTH HASH
Contini, Lenstra, and Steinfeld proposed a new hash function primitive, VSH, very
smooth hash, at the EUROCRYPT 2006 Conference [22]. In this chapter we com-
ment on the resistance of VSH against some standard cryptanalytic attacks, includ-
ing preimage attacks and collision search for a truncated VSH. Although the authors
of VSH claim only collision resistance, we show why one must be very careful when
using VSH in cryptographic engineering, where additional security properties are
often required.
This work was originally published in the INDOCRYPT 2006 conference [99].
6.1 Introduction
Many existing cryptographic hash functions were originally designed to be message
digests for use in digital signature schemes. However, they are also often used as
building blocks for other cryptographic primitives, such as pseudorandom number
generators (PRNGs), message authentication codes, password security schemes, and
for deriving keying material in cryptographic protocols such as SSL, TLS, and IPSec.
These applications may use truncated versions of the hashes with an implicit
assumption that the security of such a variant against attacks is directly proportional
to the amount of entropy (bits) used from the hash result. An example of this is the
HMAC-n construction in IPSec [9]. Some signature schemes also use truncated
hashes.
VSH is based on a novel problem, VSSR (Very Smooth number nontrivial modu-
lar Square Root). A similar problem arises in the first phase of Quadratic Sieve (QS)
and Number Field Sieve (NFS) factoring algorithms. This problem is reasonably
well studied, leading to the VSSR security assumption on which the VSH security
reduction is based. All of the desirable hash function properties are difficult, if not
impossible, to prove without nonstandard assumptions. We note that proofs based
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on assumptions lead to statements that also depend on these assumptions, whether
their origins are in the traditions of symmetric or asymmetric cryptanalysis.
The only property claimed by the authors of VSH is collision resistance. Hence
the following remark from one of the authors of VSH during his presentation at the
EUROCRYPT 2006 conference in St. Petersburg:
“VSH is not a Hash Function.”
– Arjen K. Lenstra, EUROCRYPT 2006 1
In [22, Section 3], short message inversion (equivalent to preimage resistance) is
considered and one possible “solution” is provided. As it will be shown in Section
6.3 of this chapter, the solution is not adequate.
The authors therefore clearly expected VSH to exhibit some level of preimage
and second preimage resistance. These are standard requirements in the very def-
inition of a “cryptographic hash function”. The authors of VSH are very clear that
“VSH should not be used to model random oracles”. I believe that indifferentiability
from a random oracle is a central requirement for a general purpose hash function
such as SHA-3.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.2 contains a description
of VSH. Preimage resistance and algebraic properties of VSH are discussed in Section
6.3. One-wayness of the one variant proposed in the specification is discussed in
Section 6.4. We then consider collision search for truncated variants of VSH in
Section 6.5. We note other features of VSH in Section 6.6 and give our conclusions
in Section 6.7.
6.2 The VSH Algorithm
VSH was initially circulated as an IACR ePrint in 2005 [23]. There were many
changes to VSH before its final publication at EUROCRYPT 2006 [22]. In March
2006 the length padding was changed to be performed after the message has been
hashed, rather than at the beginning. Such small changes have significant impli-
cations on the development of practical attacks. Remarkably, the “security proof”
1Quoted with permission.
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required no modification. The attacks discussed in this chapter apply only to the
published EUROCRYPT version of VSH; other attacks may be devised on other vari-
ants.
We describe the VSH algorithm in its most basic form, essentially as it appears
in [22]. We note that our attacks can be extended to most of the variants given in
the VSH paper, especially the Fast VSH variant in section 3.1 of [22].
Let p1 = 2, p2 = 3, p3 = 5, . . . be the sequence of primes. Let n be a large RSA
composite. Let k, the block length, be the largest integer such that
∏k
i=1 pi < n. Let
m be an l-bit message to be hashed, consisting of bits m1,m2, . . . ,ml, and assume
that l < 2k. To compute the hash of m:
1. Let x0 = 1.
2. Let L = dl/ke be the number of blocks. Let mi = 0 for l < i ≤ Lk (padding).
3. Let l =
∑k
i=1 li2
i−1, with li ∈ {0, 1}, be the binary representation of the mes-
sage length l, and define mLk+i = li for 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
4. For j = 0, 1, . . . , L in succession compute:
xj+1 = x2j
k∏
i=1
p
m(jk+i)
i mod n. (6.1)
5. Return xL+1.
Selecting a 1024-bit modulus n was suggested in the original paper, indicating a
131-bit block size k.
6.3 Preimage resistance
We first show that VSH is multiplicative for non-overlapping bit strings.
Theorem 6.1 (VSH is Multiplicative). Let x, y, and z be three bit strings of equal
length, where z consists only of zero bits and the strings satisfy x ∧ y = z. It follows
that:
H(z)H(x ∨ y) ≡ H(x)H(y) (mod n). (6.2)
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Proof. The VSH compression in Equation 6.1 produces the hash as a product of
primes, each selected by individual bits of the message. Because of the condition,
no bit gets selected twice. Initial squaring has no effect on multiplicativity regardless
of the particular selection of x0 = 1.
This multiplicative property is similar, although simpler, than the one used by
Coppersmith to attack (then) Annex D of X.509 [26].
As a result, VSH succumbs to a classical time-memory trade-off attack that ap-
plies to multiplicative and additive hashes. The attack is similar in many aspects to
Shanks’ baby-step giant-step algorithm for discrete logarithms [104].
We set the secret message m as (x ∨ y) and rewrite the equation as:
H(y) = H(x)−1H(z)H(m) (mod n). (6.3)
To solve the l-bit preimage m of H(m):
1. Tabulate H(x | 00 · · · 0)−1H(z)H(m) (mod n) for 0 ≤ x < 2l/2.
2. Do table lookups for H(00 · · · 0 | y) for y = 0, 1, 2, . . ., looking for a match.
The algorithm terminates when m = x | y, in other words before y < 2l/2. A
preimage attack on VSH therefore has approximately 2l/2 complexity, rather than
approximately 2l as expected.
Final squarings proposed in [22, Section 3] under the subtitle “short message
inversion” do not protect against this attack.
This type of attack is extremely serious if VSH is used to secure passwords, a
typical application for hash functions. Note that the complexity of the attack does
not depend on the modulus size n, but on the entropy of the password strings.
Example 6.1. VSH is being used to secure a 4-character lower case alphabetic password
M , stored with ASCII encoding. For demonstration purposes we choose k = 32 and a
169-bit modulus n:
n = (284 + 3)(285 − 19)
= 748288838313422294120286382894166426220969123119047.
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The hash of the secret is:
H(m) = 16844120625154617337159062413466716693049866864325. (6.4)
In this case H(z) = 13; the first iteration yields 1, and the second round 13, the sixth
prime, as the length of the message is 25 = 32 bits. We tabulateH(x)−1H(z)H(m) ( mod
n) for 262 = 676 values T [0 . . . 675]:
x: aa.. Binary: 01100001 01100001 00000000 00000000
T[0] = 91345572106882035279752100576530653
x: ab.. Binary: 01100001 01100010 00000000 00000000
T[1] = 116156501606261492576199026944080853
. . .
x: zz.. Binary: 01111010 01111010 00000000 00000000
T[675] = 384284712674090018973838770853950813384926485216514 .
In the second phase we run through the values of H(y):
H(..aa) = 3904844677556216209933
H(..ab) = 3396095819174949308197 ...
A match is found after 83 steps at H(..df) = 30205660456999582781162559493,
which matches with T [18] = H(as..)−1H(z)H(m) (mod n). Hence the secret pass-
word M is “asdf”.
Note that it is not necessary to store the entire value to the table T [i]; an appropriate
number of least significant bits usually suffices. When the table is indexed by, say,
T [i] mod 232, the search becomes an O(1) operation.
This example illustrates that password cracking time is effectively “square-rooted”
by this attack; l-character passwords offer a level of security expected from l/2-character
passwords.
6.4 One-wayness (of the “Cubing” Variant)
In [22, Section 3.4], a variant that uses cubing instead of squaring in its compression
function is proposed.
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We recall from elementary number theory the Legendre symbol, which is defined
for a prime p as:
(x
p
)
=

0 if x ≡ 0 (mod p)
+1 if x 6= 0 (mod p) and for some integer y, y2 ≡ x
−1 if there is no such y.
(6.5)
The Jacobi symbol is a generalization of the Legendre symbol. If a number n has
the prime factorization n =
∏
i p
αi
i , its Jacobi symbol is:(x
n
)
=
∏
i
( x
pi
)αi
. (6.6)
See [70, Section 2.4.5] for further properties of the Jacobi symbol and a de-
scription of an algorithm for computing it in polynomial time without knowing the
factorization of n.
VHS uses an RSA modulus of type n = pq, and hence:
(a
n
)
=
(a
p
)(a
q
)
. (6.7)
Using the Jacobi symbol, the compression function:
xj+1 = x3j
k∏
i=1
pmii mod n, (6.8)
can be transformed into:
(xj+1
n
)
=
(xj
n
) k∏
i=1
(pi
n
)mi
. (6.9)
We may ignore the zero case of the Jacobi symbol as it is does not occur in
the multiplicative group where VSH works. Multiplication of Jacobi symbols in the
set {1,−1} is isomorphic to other representations of this group, including addition
modulo 2.
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Definition 6.1. A “binary” version of the Jacobi can be represented as:
j(c, n) =
1
2
(
1−
( c
n
))
. (6.10)
Table 6.1 illustrates the isomorphism of these two representations of the group
of integers (mod2).
(
a
n
)
j(a, n)
(
b
n
)
j(b, n)
(
a
n
)(
b
n
)
j(a, n)⊕ j(b, n)
+1 0 +1 0 +1 0
+1 0 -1 1 -1 1
-1 1 +1 0 -1 1
-1 1 -1 1 +1 0
Table 6.1: Isomorphism of the multiplicative group defined by {−1, 1} and the ad-
ditive group {0, 1}.
We now have a linear equation giving the parity of some message bits:
j(xj+1, n) = j(xj , n) +
k∑
i=1
j(pi, n)mi (mod 2). (6.11)
Note that the Jacobi symbol can be very efficiently computed and that j(pi, n) is
essentially random for each randomly generated composite n. If the same message
has been hashed with k different moduli n, a system of k linear equations can be ob-
tained, leading to disclosure of bits by solving the system of equations (see Example
6.2).
This attack applies to the standard squaring version, but only leaks information
about the message length, since there is an additional squaring operation at the
end. This was not the case for VSH versions 3.57 and before (ePrint revisions of
VSH published before March 2006), where information about the contents of the
last message block could be obtained.
One-wayness is implied by the standard hash security requirement of preimage
resistance. If information about some of the preimage bits can easily be obtained
then it is possible to find the rest faster in an exhaustive search, as the search space
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is smaller.
Example 6.2. Assume that a 64-bit password has been hashed with VSH. For demon-
stration purposes we define the modulus n to be equivalent to the RSA-1024 factoring
challenge number n = 1350..(300 digits)..7563 [93].
The Jacobi symbols for the first small primes modulo n are:
( 2
n
)
= −1
( 3
n
)
= −1
( 5
n
)
= −1
( 7
n
)
= 1
(11
n
)
= 1
(13
n
)
= −1 · · · (6.12)
Since the length padding (last round) will simply consist of cubing the product of primes
and multiplying the result by the length indicator p6 = 13, we may write:
(H(m)
n
)
=
(13
n
) 64∏
i=1
(pi
n
)mi
. (6.13)
Using the binary j(c, n) function and knowledge of n, this can be further simplified into
the following parity equation:
j(H(m), n) ≡ 1 +m1 +m2 +m3 +m6 +m7 +m10 +m13 +m14 +m15 +
m16 +m17 +m22 +m24 +m25 +m26 +m27 +m28 +m29 +
m31 +m33 +m36 +m39 +m40 +m43 +m44 +m46 +m49 +
m51 +m52 +m57 +m59 +m61 +m64 (mod 2).
We can therefore speed up dictionary search against the password by a factor close
to two, as half of the password candidates can be rejected with simple bit shift, AND
and XOR operations, rather than with computationally expensive modular arithmetic
required to compute the full hash.
Note that if the same secret has been hashed with multiple different moduli n,
the speedup grows almost exponentially; two distinct moduli yield a speedup factor
close to four, etc.
6.5 Collision Search for Truncated VSH Variants
VSH produces a very long hash (typically 1024 bits). There are no indications that
a truncated VSH hash offers security that is commensurate to the hash length. This
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appears to rule out the applicability of VSH in digital signature schemes which pro-
duce signatures shorter than the VSH hash result, such as Elliptic Curve signature
schemes.
To illustrate this point, we describe an attack on one truncated variant of VSH.
6.5.1 Partial Collision Attacks
We first discuss a generic technique for turning a partial collision attack into a full
collision attack.
Assume that there is a fast O(1) mapping f that causes the hash result of an
l-bit hash H to be in some smaller subset of possible outputs H(f(x)) ∈ S, where
|S| < 2l. Typically f would be chosen in such a way that certain hash result bits are
forced to have the same constant value. In other words, f forces partial collisions.
Note that f itself should not produce too many collisions, i.e. x1 6= x2 usually means
that f(x1) 6= f(x2).
If such an f can be found, and it is fast, the complexity of finding full collisions
becomes approximately
√|S|. Note that f does not need to be able to force the
hash to S on each iteration, it is sufficient that it works with reasonable probability.
Consider Floyd’s collision search algorithm, as discussed in Section 2.5.2. The
iteration becomes si+1 = H(f(si)). Faster parallel collision search algorithms such
as those described in [108] can also be used.
6.5.2 Attack on VSH Truncated to Least Significant 128 bits
We will instantiate this attack on a VSH variant that only uses the least-significant
128 bits of the hash function result. For basic VSH (1024-bit modulus n, k = 131)
the result of hashing a 128-bit message m1|m2| · · · |m128 can be simplified to:
H(m) =
(
19
( 128∏
i=1
pmii
)2 mod n) mod 2128. (6.14)
The constant 19 = p8 is caused by the length padding in the second (and final)
round.
Modular reduction by n occurs in this case only if the product is larger than
n. For random m, half of the 128 first small primes are missing from the product
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i=1 p
mi
i , so its geometric mean is roughly
∏128
i=1 p
1
2
i ≈ 2495.0. If we consider Equa-
tion 6.14, the expected size of the product becomes 19×2495.02 ≈ 2994.2. Simulations
show that modular reduction by 21023 < n < 21024 is required only with probability
P = 37%.
We get the following approximation that is valid with significant probability:
H(m) = 19
( 128∏
i=1
pmii
)2 mod 2128. (6.15)
Note that the iteration is independent of the RSA modulus n if there is no reduction.
Precomputation phase: For each of the 241 bit strings r = r1 | r2 | · · · | r41 of
length 41, we compute and store r into a lookup table, indexed by the product:
( 42∏
i=2
p
ri−1
i
)−1 mod 242. (6.16)
We will choose the f mapping as follows:
1. Select message bits m43,m44, . . . ,m128 from corresponding bits of si.
2. Compute the partial product
∏128
j=43 p
mj
j mod 2
42 and use that to select mes-
sage bits m2,m3, . . . ,m42 using the lookup table (m1 is always set to zero).
This will often (P ≈ 0.5) force the least significant 42 bits to a certain constant
value, 19, on each iteration. Note that if the table lookup fails, we may select
m2,m3, . . . ,m42 to be some arbitrary deterministic value; one that satisfies si ≡
19 (mod 2l) for some l < 42 would be a good choice.
Hence we can cause the iteration to run in a significantly smaller output subset
with essentially O(1) effort (constant-factor increase), and collisions can be found
significantly faster.
Example 6.3. We will start with s1 = 242+19, and try to produce a sequence satisfying
si ≡ 19 (mod 242) for a significant portion of i.
The partial product
∏128
i=43 p
mi
i mod 2
42 yields p43 = 191 for s1. We will then
perform a lookup in the precomputed table; it turns out that selecting message bits m1
through m42 as:
01110010 01010101 00000000 11100001 11110111 00,
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will force the product into the desired subset. The product of primes corresponding to
those message bits is:
3 ·5 ·7 ·17 ·29 ·37 ·43 ·53 ·97 ·101 ·103 ·131 ·137 ·139 ·149 ·151 ·163 ·167 ·173 (6.17)
= 1164213571911795168635778009100095, (6.18)
and this multiplied by the partial product satisfies:
191 · 1164213571911795168635778009100095 ≡ 1 (mod 242). (6.19)
Clearly squaring a number that is congruent to 1 mod 242 maintains the property. The
final multiplication by 19 results in the second element of the sequence satisfying the
desired property s2 ≡ 19 (mod 242). We have:
s2 = 19 (191 · 1164213571911795168635778009100095)2 mod 2128 (6.20)
= 0x79424F79408D6B27F52A500000000013. (6.21)
With this sequence we only need to rely on a birthday collision in the upper 128− 42 =
86 bits of the sequence. Roughly 243 iterations are required using algorithms of [108]
to achieve this.
Note that with some probability this algorithm will yield false collisions due to
the fact that the inverse of the partial product is not always found in the lookup
table. Modular reduction by n may also cause false collisions. This only results in a
small constant factor increase to the complexity of the algorithm, however; we only
need to restart with different starting points until a proper collision is found. We
estimate that the constant factor
6.5.3 Overall complexity of attack
In essence, the complexity of this attack against VSH truncated to l bits is:
- Pre-computing the table offline: ≈ 2 l3 time and space;
- Finding collisions: ≈ 2 l3 iterations;
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- Total cost: roughly ≈ 2 l3 , rather than ≈ 2 l2 as expected from a hash function
with good pseudorandomness properties.
We acknowledge that this represents just one way of truncating VSH. It is likely
that other truncated variants can be attacked using a different f function, and will
have a different attack complexity. Using, say, the most significant bits of the result
(rather the least significant bits) would result in an even faster attack.
6.6 Other features of VSH
The authors of VSH do not explicitly note this, but the hash function result can
be updated after small changes to the message without computing the entire hash
again; a “bit flip” in a message will always cause a predictable change in the mes-
sage result (it becomes multiplied mod n by certain a power of a small prime or its
inverse). This is due to the highly algebraic nature of the hash.
We note that such a property may be useful in some applications where rapid
update of the hash is required, but it is undesirable in many more, as it can facili-
tate adaptive attacks against some cryptographic protocols. A similar multiplicative
property was sufficient for the X.509 Annex D hash function to be considered broken
[26].
6.7 Conclusions
In our opinion VSH is a simple and elegant design that is based on a plausible
complexity-theoretic assumption. However, we have demonstrated that VSH should
not be considered as a general-purpose hash function as usually understood in secu-
rity engineering. VSH is not preimage resistant (Section 6.3) and truncated versions
are not collision-resistant (Section 6.5).
CHAPTER 7
STATISTICAL-ALGEBRAIC TESTING
Statistical testing has traditionally been a part of evaluation of cryptographic prim-
itives. However, most cryptographers agree that generic tests such as the NIST
800-22 suite are appropriate mainly for catching implementation errors rather than
determining the cryptographic strength of an algorithm [74, 94].
In Chapter 6 we applied a linearization attack on the VSH hash function. This
is an extreme example of an algebraic attack [28]. Most hash functions cannot be
linearized, but algebraic (relinearization) attacks have been successfully applied to
other cryptographic primitives of relatively low algebraic degree, such as the MiFare
Crypt 1 stream ciphers [30]. Algebraic attacks have also been applied to the AES
[31] and DES [29] block ciphers, although the effectiveness of these attacks remains
debatable.
Algebraic attacks work when the underlying Boolean function of a cryptographic
primitive is “simple” [28]. How would one automatically distinguish such a simple
function of n bits from a random one? One solution is to examine its Algebraic
Normal Form (ANF) representation for anomalies such as redundancy or bias. A
test that utilizes this approach was first proposed by Eric Filiol in 2002 [37]. In this
chapter we will give further theoretical and experimental evidence of the applica-
bility of ANF-based tests on hash functions.
The structure of this chapter is as follows. In Section 7.1 we recall the Algebraic
Normal Form and its basic properties. Section 7.2 contains an exposition of a variant
of Filiol’s d-monomial statistical test. Section 7.3 gives new, clear evidence of the
relationship between Boolean gate complexity and the d-monomial test.
The theoretical work described in this chapter was originally published in [97,
98], together with experimental results in the context of black-box Chosen-IV at-
tacks on stream ciphers. The experimental MD5 and SHA-1 results contained in
Section 7.4 have not been previously published.
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7.1 Preliminaries
Let Fn2 be the vector space defined by n-vectors x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn), where xi ∈ F2,
i.e. each of the n entries have values 0 or 1 and computations are defined modulo
2. A Boolean function f of n variables is simply a mapping f : Fn2 7→ F2. There are
exactly 22
n
distinct Boolean functions of n variables, each uniquely defined by its
truth table.
There are many alternative representations for Boolean functions, such as Con-
junctive and Disjunctive Normal Forms (CNF and DNF), which are widely used in
automated theorem proving and other fields of theoretical computer science [12].
We will focus on Algebraic Normal Form.
Definition 7.1 (Algebraic Normal Form). A function fˆ : Fn2 7→ F2 satisfying:
f(x) =
∑
a∈Fn2
fˆ(a)
n∏
i=1
xaii , (7.1)
is an Algebraic Normal Form representation of a Boolean function f : Fn2 7→ F2.
In our notation the “hat” fˆ on top of function f indicates that it is the ANF form
of the function defined by the truth table form f . There are many competing nota-
tions for ANF. We use the classical 1927 Zhegalkin polynomial notation [107, 121].
Especially in digital electronics, ANF is also known as RSE (Ring Sum Expansion)
[115] and Positive Polarity Reed-Muller Expression (PPRM) [102].
Using the transformed function fˆ , a multivariate polynomial representation of f
can be obtained, as can be seen from the following example.
Example 7.1. Consider the Boolean function f : F32 7→ F2 defined by the following
table:
f(0, 0, 0) = 1, f(1, 0, 0) = 0, f(0, 1, 0) = 1, f(1, 1, 0) = 0,
f(0, 0, 1) = 1, f(1, 0, 1) = 1, f(0, 1, 1) = 0, f(1, 1, 1) = 1.
As indicated by Definition 7.1, we wish to find a function fˆ that for all x satisfies:
f(x1, x2, x3) = fˆ(0, 0, 0) + fˆ(1, 0, 0)x1 + fˆ(0, 1, 0)x2 + fˆ(1, 1, 0)x1x2+ (7.2)
fˆ(0, 0, 1)x3 + fˆ(1, 0, 1)x1x3 + fˆ(0, 1, 1)x2x3 + fˆ(1, 1, 1)x1x2x3.
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This corresponds to solving the following system of linear equations in F2:
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0
1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1


fˆ(0, 0, 0)
fˆ(1, 0, 0)
fˆ(0, 1, 0)
fˆ(1, 1, 0)
fˆ(0, 0, 1)
fˆ(1, 0, 1)
fˆ(0, 1, 1)
fˆ(1, 1, 1)

=

f(0, 0, 0) = 1
f(1, 0, 0) = 0
f(0, 1, 0) = 1
f(1, 1, 0) = 0
f(0, 0, 1) = 1
f(1, 0, 1) = 1
f(0, 1, 1) = 0
f(1, 1, 1) = 1

. (7.3)
The solution to this matrix equation is easily obtained by Gaussian elimination:
fˆ(0, 0, 0) = 1, fˆ(1, 0, 0) = 1,
fˆ(0, 1, 0) = 0, fˆ(1, 1, 0) = 0,
fˆ(0, 0, 1) = 0, fˆ(1, 0, 1) = 1,
fˆ(0, 1, 1) = 1, fˆ(1, 1, 1) = 1.
From Equation 7.2 we see that the ones in fˆ directly give the five monomials in the
polynomial expression for f :
f(x1, x2, x3) = 1 + x1 + x1x3 + x2x3 + x1x2x3. (7.4)
7.1.1 Properties of the Algebraic Normal Form
We briefly summarize some of the most important properties of ANF that are rel-
evant to the present discussion. An introduction to Boolean Algebra and normal
forms can be found in [40].
F.1 A unique fˆ exists for all Boolean functions f .
F.2 The ANF transform is its own inverse, an involution; g = fˆ if and only if gˆ = f .
F.3 We define a partial order for vectors x as follows: x ≤ y iff xi ≤ yi for all i.
Using the partial order ≤, Definition 7.1 can be written as fˆ(x) =∑a≤x f(a).
F.4 The Hamming distance d(x,y) between x and y is the number of positions
where xi 6= yi.
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F.5 A norm, called the Hamming weight, wt(x) = d(0,x), is equivalent to the
number of positions in x where xi = 1.
F.6 The algebraic degree deg(f) is the maximum Hamming weight x that satisfies
fˆ(x) = 1; this is equivalent to the length of the longest monomial (most
variables) in the polynomial representation of f .
F.7 Functions of degree one are affine functions. If the constant term fˆ(0, 0, . . . , 0) =
0, an affine function is simply a sum of some of its input bits and is called a
linear function.
F.8 A d-Truncated Algebraic Normal Form of Boolean function f , denoted fˆd(x), is
equal to fˆ(x) when wt(x) ≤ d, and zero otherwise. In essence, monomials of
degree greater than d have been removed from the corresponding polynomial
of the truncated ANF.
F.9 Since fˆ(x) is the sum of f at all positions with smaller or equal partial order
(and hence degree) than x (F.3), it can be seen that if we have tabulated
f(y) at all positions y with wt(y) ≤ d, the d-truncated ANF can be completely
determined.
7.1.2 Computing the ANF
Networks and algorithms for computing the complete ANF do not require more than
n2n−1 additions in F2. These algorithms perform a Fast Walsh Transform (FWT)
[105]. The transformation from truth table form to Algebraic Form is sometimes
confusingly called the Mo¨bius transform. Hence the name, “Mo¨bius test” in Filiol’s
original paper on d-Monomial tests [37]. Other essentially equivalent names used
in the literature include Walsh-Hadamard transform, Hadamard-Rademacher-Walsh
transform, Walsh transform, and Walsh-Fourier transform. The algorithm for FWT
is originally due to Shanks [105], although its direct relationship with ANF was only
discovered later. The transformation is widely used in Digital Signal Processing.
Let z : Fn2 7→ Z be the standard mapping from binary vectors to integers; z(x) =∑n
i=1 2
i−1xi. Let v be a binary-valued vector of length 2n that contains the truth
table of f ; vz(x)+1 = f(x) for all x. Algorithm 7.1 gives a fast method for computing
fˆ from f .
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Algorithm 7.1 Compute the Algebraic Normal Form in vector v of length 2n using
two auxiliary vectors t and u of length 2n−1.
for j = 1, 2, 3, . . . , n do
for i = 1, 2, . . . , 2n−1 do
ti ← v2i−1 Left half.
ui ← v2i−1 ⊕ v2i Right half.
end for
v ← t | u Concatenate the halves.
end for
The complexity of Algorithm 7.1 is clearly O(n lg n). Variants of this algorithm
can be implemented very efficiently using shifts and bit-manipulation operations.
7.2 The d-Monomial Tests
In [37] Filiol introduced “Mo¨bius tests”, which examine whether or not an ANF
expression of a Boolean function has the expected number of d-degree monomials.
With d = 0 the test is called the Affine test and for d > 0 a d-Monomial test. Filiol’s
test is closely related to the d-Monomial test described in this section.
Note that the following exposition of the test / distinguisher is significantly sim-
pler and less formal than that originally proposed by Filiol. Details have been mod-
ified for the purposes of this thesis. The reader is encouraged to use [37] as a
reference for Filiol’s version of the test.
In practical terms, the d-Monomial test involves counting the number of ones
fˆ(x) = 1 of an ANF transformed function f at positions x with Hamming weight d.
A d-truncated ANF is sufficient for this purpose. A χ2 statistical test is then applied
to this count to see if the count is exceptionally high or low.
Theorem 7.1 (ANF of a random function has no bias.). For a randomly chosen n-bit
Boolean function f , Pr[fˆ(x) = 1] = 1/2 for all x.
Proof. Trivial. Since the ANF transformation is bijective on the truth table of f , fˆ
will be random if f is.
Consider an n-bit Boolean function f . Our null hypothesis is that the expected
bit-count
∑
wt(x)=d fˆ(x) is
1
2
(
n
d
)
and that the bit-count is binomially distributed. The
alternative hypothesis is that there is a bias in this sum, up or down.
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We can the use classical χ2 test of Pearson and Friedman in this case [39, 44,
106]. Suppose that we sample fˆ at N distinct points (in this case with wt(x) = d)
and in M of those fˆ(x) = 1. Then we set:
χ2 =
1
N
(2M −N)2 . (7.5)
Since “0” and “1” cases in the bit-count are mutually exclusive, there is one de-
gree of freedom in the test. Using the cumulative degree-one distribution function
of χ2, we can determine a confidence level for f being distinguishable from random
in our test. We call this the P value and its intuitive interpretation is the “prob-
ability that the null hypothesis is true”. For example, if P is 0.01, there is still a
1% probability that the null hypothesis is true (and the function is, in this sense,
“random”).
Some critical values for χ2 and the corresponding P significance values are given
in Table 7.1.
Table 7.1: Critical values for the χ2 with one degree of freedom.
χ2 P
6.635 0.01
10.83 0.001
18.70 2−16
40.17 2−32
24.02 2−40
83.82 2−64
105.8 2−80
This type of test is dependent upon the sample size; even a very slightly biased
function will yield a high χ2 value by the test if the sample size is allowed to be ar-
bitrarily large. The sample sizes are bound by computational restrictions, however.
7.3 Gate Complexity and the d-Monomial Test
In this section we will give a formal definition for gate complexity and investigate
its relationship with the d-Monomial test. Our definition of gate complexity follows
from that used by Hiltgen in his investigation of one-wayness of Boolean functions
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in [52].
Definition 7.2 (Gate complexity of a Boolean function). The gate complexity of a
Boolean function f(x1, x2, . . . , xn), is the minimum number of gates required to im-
plement it in an acyclic circuit network. A gate is a Boolean function with two inputs.
The constant functions 0 and 1, together with trivial functions x1, x2, . . . have gate
complexity 0.
Figure 7.1: A Boolean function with gate complexity 7.
Note that all 22
2
= 16 two-bit functions count as a single gate, not just the
standard ones (∨, ∧, ¬, ⊕). Gate complexity is asymptotically equivalent to circuit
size complexity [21, 115].
We have determined the gate complexity of all 22
4
= 65536 four-bit Boolean
functions. This was done by performing an exhaustive search over all circuits with
one gate, two gates, etc, until circuits for all functions had been found. The task
was computationally nontrivial, even though we optimized the code to take various
symmetries and isometries into account.
The maximum gate complexity turned out to be 7. Figure 7.1 shows one of the
2720 Boolean functions with maximum complexity, together with its polynomial
modulo 2.
In Figure 7.1, a filled circle indicates that the given input to the gate is inverted.
This function can not be implemented with, say, six gates (regardless of the choice
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of gates).
Table 7.2 gives the distribution of functions by gate complexity, where Gi is the
number of functions of gate complexity i. These values sum to
∑
iGi = 65536. Here
gi,d is the number of monomials in functions of degree d and gate complexity i. The
maximum possible value for gi,d is Gi
(
4
d
)
. From Theorem 7.1 we know that the
expected number in a d-monomial test is half of this value. Table 7.2 also contains
the fraction qi,d = gi,d/(Gi
(
4
d
)
), which has the expected value 1/2 for a random
function.
Note from Table 7.2 how the d-Monomial “bias” qi,d tends to be strongly increas-
ing as the gate complexity i grows (apart from an isolated anomaly at q6,4). This is
clear evidence of a correlation between the complexity of a Boolean circuit and the
d-monomial test. It is plausible to expect that a similar phenomenon is exhibited
by Boolean functions with more than four inputs. However, the exact degree of this
bias is currently an open problem for n > 4. We can expect simple functions to be
distinguishable in a d-monomial test even when n is large.
7.3.1 Distinguishing a random function from a complex function
It is interesting to note that it is even possible to test the opposite; to distinguish a
complex function from a randomly chosen one.
With the 2720 functions of gate complexity 7, all d-Monomial counts appear to
be biased upwards; q7,d ≥ 0.5. We will use a d-Monomial test to create a distin-
guisher based on this fact, particularly that q7,1 = 0.606.
Consider the following game. There is a list L containing binary vectors of length
five. Entries in L have been generated with one of the following two methods:
1. Choose a completely random Boolean function (one of the 65536 possibilities)
and add the following vector to the list:
(
f(0, 0, 0, 0), f(1, 0, 0, 0), f(0, 1, 0, 0), f(0, 0, 1, 0), f(0, 0, 0, 1)
)
. (7.6)
2. Choose a random 4-bit Boolean function of gate complexity 7, and create a
vector as in Equation 7.6. Add that to the list L.
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We pose the following question: How long does L need to be for us to see which
type of list it is ?
We first note that the vectors contain sufficient information for computation
of 1-Monomial tests of f (e.g. fˆ(1, 0, 0, 0) = f(0, 0, 0, 0) + f(1, 0, 0, 0)). Each 1-
Monomial test is simply the sum of four bits in the ANF result. The expected sum
after n list entries is 2n for a random function and based on our exhaustive search,
g7,1×n
G7
= 65922720n ≈ 2.424n for a gate complexity 7 function.
We will set the length of the list to n = 34 steps. In the first, fully random,
function the expected value for the total sum is 2× 34 = 68. In the second case, the
sum can be expected to reach 34 × g7,1n/G7 = 3465922720 = 82.4. The probability that
82 or more bits from 4× 34 = 136 bits is one is given by:
1
2136
136∑
i=82
(
136
i
)
≈ 0.01013. (7.7)
Hence the list of (partially computed and randomly chosen) “complex” functions
can be distinguished from a list computed using random functions with P = 99%
significance level of certainty with a list of only 34 entries! Note that this significance
was computed exactly using binomial sums, rather than using the more generic χ2
test.
7.4 Statistical Tests of MD5 and SHA-1
NIST Special Publication 800-90 [5] specifies a set of deterministic random bit gen-
erator mechanisms (DRBG mechanisms) based on hash functions, elliptic curves
and block ciphers.
The hash-based proposal, DRBG_Hash, consists of an instantiation procedure, re-
seeding procedure, and the random bit generation procedure. Let x be a 440-bit
seed value. A sequence of 160-bit pseudorandom blocks is obtained by:
Wi =W (x+ i (mod 2440)). (7.8)
The 440-bit modulus was chosen so that an 8-bit padding byte and the 64-bit
message length fits as a single 440 + 8 + 64 = 512-bit input block to the SHA-1
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compression function. The DRBG_Hash construction can be adopted to use MD5,
although each output block Wi will only have 128 bits.
7.4.1 d-Monomial Test Results
We used randomized seeds and generated 16 megabytes of pseudorandom data
using DBRG_Hash with the MD5 hash function and 20 megabytes of pseudorandom
data from DBRG_Hash with the SHA-1 hash function. Intermediate iteration results
were stored. In both cases, the generator ran exactly 220 iterations in both cases.
Due to the nature of the message expansion of MD5 and SHA-1, incrementing
the counter (Equation 7.8) only affects the state of the hash function at the 14th
iteration in both cases.
Figures 7.2 and 7.3 illustrate the results. In these figures the x-axis corresponds
to the iteration (out of 64 for MD5, 80 for SHA-1) and the y-axis gives the confidence
level of the distinguisher. The confidence level is given in binary form. The value c
corresponds to P value 1−2−c. For example, the horizontal line c = 10 corresponds
to confidence level P = 1− 2−10 ≈ 0.999.
We further note that the measurement was done on the word computed at the
given iteration; this word is shifted in the iteration and remains available for three
(MD5) or four (SHA-1) further iterations.
Our main observation is that 4-Monomial tests seem to be the most effective
against both MD5 and SHA-1. A DRBG_Hash 4-Monomial distinguisher works with
significant probability (P > 0.99) against MD5 reduced to 21 iterations and SHA-1
reduced to 24 iterations. This distinguisher is more effective than any other general-
purpose statistical test that we have investigated, including the tests included in
[94].
We also applied the d-monomial tests to Chosen-IV attacks against stream ci-
phers, where it proved to be highly effective against many targets [97, 98]. It can
be assumed that chosen-IV distinguisher attacks were not carefully considered by
some stream cipher designers.
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7.5 Conclusions
We have discussed the application of Algebraic Normal Form and d-Monomial tests
in cryptography. We have demonstrated that these tests appear to be effective in
distinguishing “simple” Boolean functions, as well as (rather surprisingly) complex
functions, from random ones.
In an experiment with the MD5 and SHA-1 hash functions in the DRBG_Hash
pseudorandom-number generator mode, we were able to distinguish the result from
a random bit string when the number of iterations of these functions was reduced
to one third of the full hash function. The complexity of the distinguisher was
negligible (about 5 seconds to compute on a typical desktop PC).
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Figure 7.2: Results of d-Monomial tests on MD5 in DRBG Hash mode. X-axis repre-
sents the number of rounds and Y-axis the P-value as − log2(1− P ).
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Figure 7.3: Results of d-Monomial tests on SHA-1 in DRBG Hash mode. X-axis
represents the number of rounds and Y-axis the P-value as − log2(1− P ).
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CHAPTER 8
LASH – A HASH FUNCTION PROPOSAL
We present LASH, a practical cryptographic hash function based on the Miyaguchi–
Preneel construction [72, 84, 85], which instead of using a block cipher as the
main component uses modular matrix multiplication. Thus, as the core component
it uses a compression function which is closely related to the theoretical lattice-
based hash function considered by Goldreich, Goldwasser and Halevi in [42]. With
suitable parameter choices we can produce a hash function which is comparable in
performance to existing deployed hash functions such as SHA-1 and SHA-2.
We note that a more detailed analysis of LASH is contained in [11], which also
deals with the lattice-based proof of security. This material, and also certain as-
pects of the performance analysis, has been left out of this thesis as they were not
contributed by the author.
Section 8.1 describes the LASH algorithm, and its design criteria is contained in
Section 8.2. The choice of parameter selection was greatly influenced the author,
and this analysis is provided in Section 8.3. Section 8.4 contains conclusions and an
update on the security of LASH.
8.1 Description of LASH
LASH-x computes an x-bit hash value from an input bit sequence of arbitrary length.
There are four concrete proposals, where n is the size of input to the compression
function in bits, and m is the size of the chaining variable in 8-bit bytes. For all
versions, m = n/16 and q = 256. Table 8.1 gives the parameters for proposed
variants of LASH.
90
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Table 8.1: Proposed parameter selection for variants of LASH.
Variant n m
LASH-160 640 40
LASH-256 1024 64
LASH-384 1536 96
LASH-512 2048 128
8.1.1 Pseudorandom Sequence
Consider the following pseudorandom sequence. Start with y0 = 54321 and iterate
the following recurrence:
yi+1 = y2i + 2 (mod 2
31 − 1). (8.1)
We call the recurrence in Equation 8.1 the “Pollard generator”, as its iteration is
the same as in the Pollard ρ method for factoring integers [83]. The modulus 231−1
is prime, and this nonlinear sequence has tail and cycle lengths 14653 and 19118,
respectively (see Section 2.5.2 for more information).
We define an additional sequence that results in reducing yi to byte length:
ai = yi (mod 28). (8.2)
The first ten members of this sequence are:
a0 = 49, a1 = 100, a2 = 135, a3 = 237, a4 = 95,
a5 = 26, a6 = 139, a7 = 214, a8 = 163, a9 = 194.
8.1.2 Compression Function
We define a compression function f that takes in two byte sequences r0, r1, . . . , rm−1
and s0, s1, . . ., sm−1 and produces a new byte sequence t0, t1, . . . , tm−1. Algorithm 8.1
describes the LASH compression function.
The compression function can be represented as:
f(r, s) = (r ⊕ s) + fH(r | s) (mod q), (8.3)
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where fH is the linear function obtained from multiplying a matrix H, defined using
the sequence a0, a1, . . . , of Equation 8.2, by the column vector (r | s)T , considered
as a bit vector. Thus the compression function is based on a combination of addition
modulo 256 and XORing.
In the following description of the LASH compression function ti, ri, and si are
byte vectors and x is a temporary Boolean variable.
Algorithm 8.1 LASH Compression Function t = f(r, s) .
for i = 0, 1, . . . ,m− 1 do
ti ← ri ⊕ si
end for
for i = 0, 1, . . . , n do
if i < 8m then
x← b2−(7−(i mod 8))rbi/8cc mod 2
else
x← b2−(7−(i mod 8))s(bi/8c−m)c mod 2
end if
if x = 1 then
for j = 0, 1, . . . ,m− 1 do
tj ← tj + a((n+j−i) mod n) mod 256
end for
end if
end for
return t
8.1.3 Hashing the message
Let l be the length of the original message in bits. The individual message bytes
are v0, v1, v2, . . .. The message is padded with a single 1 bit (in case of byte-aligned
data, a single byte with hexadecimal value 0x80). The rest of the vi values are taken
to be zeros.
The message is cut into k = dl/8me blocks of m bytes and fed to the compres-
sion function, and then a final transform is performed, which involves applying the
compression function to the chaining variable and an encoding of l, to produce a
message digest. Algorithm 8.2 describes the overall hash function.
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Algorithm 8.2 LASH
for i = 0, 1, . . . ,m− 1 do
ri = 0 Initialize chaining variable.
end for
for i = 0, 1, . . . , dl/8me − 1 do
for j = 0, 1, . . . ,m− 1 do
si = vm×i+j
Get a message block, remember to pad with
a 1 bit and zeroes!
end for
r← f(r, s) Run the compression function.
end for
for i = 0, 1, . . . ,m− 1 do
si ← bl/28ic mod 256 Message length in little-endian format.
end for
r← f(r, s) Final iteration of the compression function.
for i = 0, 1, . . . ,m/2− 1 do
ti = 16br2i/16c+ br2i+1/16c Take the high 4 bits of the output bytes.
end for
return t Return the m/2-byte hash result.
8.2 Design Overview
In this section we provide more detail concerning the precise design choices that we
have made.
8.2.1 Overall Design Goals
The goals of the design are as follows:
- Avoid multicollision attacks (Section 2.5.4) by using a state chaining variable
that is twice the size of the final output. This solution was originally proposed
by Lucks [64] under the name large-pipe strategy. The final hash value is
produced from the large-pipe by taking the upper bits of each byte, these being
the bits which depend in the most non-linear manner on the input values.
- To combine two forms of mathematical operation in the compression function,
arithmetic modulo 256 and bitwise exclusive-or. Thus the compression func-
tions consists of two parts, a linear function (motivated by the lattice based
hash function of Goldreich et al. [42]) and an XORing of the chaining variable
and the next message block. The mode of operation resembles that originally
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proposed and shown to be secure by Miyaguchi [72] and Preneel [84]).
- To be able to reason about the ability of the linear function to resist preimages
and collisions.
- To be as simple and efficient as possible, particularly aiming for application
on as wide a range of platforms as possible. Thus the hash function is byte-
oriented and built out of components which are found on all processors and
which are easy to implement in hardware.
- To enable as much parallelism as possible, thus allowing the hash function to
exploit performance enhancing features in modern instruction sets.
- The hash function should be patent free. None of the designers have applied
for patents on its design, and we are not aware of relevant prior art.
8.2.2 Selection of Function fH
We now turn to how we selected the precise function fH used in our construction.
We therefore need to select m, n, q and the matrix entries of H.
We first look at the values (m,n, q):
- Due to the fact that finding collisions in fH is easier than the naive qm/2, we
take m to be larger than necessary for our final hash function output. This
is also useful to defeat various other generic attacks on hash functions and is
consistent with the advice of Lucks [64].
- It turns out to be convenient in our chaining algorithm to select n = 2m log2 q
for performance reasons.
- We have found via various experiments that since the output size of the hash
function is fixed (and so m is limited), a harder lattice problem is produced if
q is smaller. Hence, we select q = 28.
All that remains is to define the particular linear function fH that we shall use,
i.e., we need to describe the m× n matrix H. We take H to be the m-by-n circulant
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matrix associated with the sequence a0, . . . , an generated by Equations 8.1 and 8.2:
H =

a0 an−1 an−2 . . . a2 a1
a1 a0 an−1 . . . a3 a2
...
. . .
...
am−1 am−2 am−3 . . . am+1 am
 . (8.4)
The reasons for this choice are as follows:
1. The use of a circulant matrix allows more efficient implementation of our
function fH , and deriving the entries via a pseudorandom number generator
allows us to reduce the memory requirements of our hash function.
2. The choice of p in the Pollard generator is made to enable a sequence with
period greater than the largest value of n and so
√
p should be greater than
the largest value of n chosen. In addition, we selected a p for which modular
reduction can be performed efficiently.
3. The non-linearity of the generator is crucial in creating a matrix for which the
associated lattice problem is hard to solve. For example, we have found that
using a linear-congruential generator [60] instead of the Pollard generator of
Equation 8.1 results in a compression function that is easy to break due to
linear relationships in the ai sequence. We refer to [11] for a more detailed
discussion regarding the lattice problem.
8.2.3 The Compression Function
Recall that the compression function for LASH is defined from the m-byte chaining
variable r and the next m-byte block s, via:
f(r, s) = (r ⊕ s) + fH(r | s) (mod q). (8.5)
The compression function is motivated by the construction of Miyaguchi–Preneel
[72, 84], which is of the form:
f(r, s) = (r ⊕ s)⊕Eg(r)(s), (8.6)
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for a block cipher Ek(m) and a function g which inputs the size of the chaining
variable and outputs keys for the block cipher.
Thus we are treating the function fH as being equivalent to a block cipher with
key r and message s. We are not claiming that the function fH can be used as a
block cipher. Hence, the “proof of security” of the Miyaguchi–Preneel construction
[17] does not apply in this situation.
8.2.4 Final Transform
In the final transform we need to compress the 8m bit chaining variable down to
the output hash value of 4m bits. Recall that each byte of the chaining variable has
been obtained by performing many additions modulo q = 256, which have been
dependent on the message bits.
To compute the final hash value we select the upper four bits of each byte of
the chaining variable and concatenate them together. This produces an output of
the correct size. The reason for taking the upper four bits is that, due to the nature
of addition modulo q, these are going to be the bits which are affected in the most
non-linear manner due to the effect of carry propagation in the addition operations.
8.3 Security Considerations
The general structure of LASH, having only linear components, easily leads one to
suspect that it is directly vulnerable to differential and linear cryptanalysis. LASH
has gone through several evolutionary stages after the idea of a lattice-based hash
function was first considered. The current version is the result of combining the
traditions of provable complexity-theoretic security with symmetric cryptanalysis.
In determining the security of LASH against these attacks, we note that as a fully
parameterisable hash function (message block size, state size, and hash result size
can all be flexibly chosen), simulation of attacks against LASH are straightforward
and meaningful. If an attack can be successfully mounted and simulated on reduced
variants of LASH, and the asymptotic behavior of the security as a function of various
parameters established, concrete evidence about the security of full-size variants is
obtained. This flexibility also makes it easy to create larger versions of LASH if
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weaknesses are found in the current versions. This is a clear advantage of LASH
over many hash function designs with more rigid, “block cipher” - like structures.
8.3.1 Differential Cryptanalysis
A small input difference (in either the chaining variable and/or the message block)
will result in a very large difference in the hash function state. The propagation of
differentials is further amplified in the final iteration (which does not use message
bits), making all output bits differentially dependent on all input bits.
We conjecture that the simple and understandable structure of LASH will make
it difficult to find differential anomalies such as the so-called necessary conditions
exploited by Wang et al in their attacks on MD5, SHA-1, and other hash functions
[111, 112, 113, 114].
8.3.2 Linear Cryptanalysis
All components of the LASH compression function are, in some sense, linear. Fur-
thermore, if we consider a matrix H ′ that contains the least significant bits of H,
then the product function H ′ · b is a linear equation in F2 and, indeed, H ′ is invert-
ible with a significant probability. This can be exploited in some attacks, as is shown
in Section 8.3.4. These attacks are difficult to extend to the full version of LASH,
however.
It is unlikely that classical linear cryptanalysis (involving the parity of subsets of
bits) can be applied to LASH [65].
8.3.3 Generalized Birthday Attack
Wagner’s method for solving the generalized birthday problem [110] can be applied
to the Goldreich-Goldwasser-Halevi (GGH) construction of [42]. We will give a brief
description of the algorithm and its limitations. Using the GGH function fH on its
own implies that we can find collisions in O(qm/3) operations, as opposed to the
O(qm/2) operations we would want in practice from a hash function.
Although improvements to this basic version of the attack can be made, this
attack does not seem to be applicable to the internal fH function used in LASH, due
to the ratio between the message block size and the size of the internal state. This
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motivates our choice of a large chaining variable and our output transform. Our use
of the Miyaguchi–Preneel construction, as opposed to using the function fH , also
directly helps to defeat this attack.
8.3.4 A Hybrid Attack
We will outline a hybrid attack that combines cycle-based collision-finding tech-
niques with linear algebra and a time-memory trade-off against the GGH function
applied directly to multi-block messages using the Merkle–Damga˚rd construction
(LASH with a different compression function, for example the function fH as the
compression function, and no output transform).
The general strategy of the attack is to try to select two-block messages in a way
that forces a cycle-based collision-finding algorithm such as [108] into a smaller cy-
cle, thus producing collisions faster. If the outputs belong to a subset S of possible
outputs, collision search will have O(
√| S |) complexity, assuming that the mes-
sage selection process is O(1). See Section 2.5.3 for a general discussion about this
technique.
The messages are chosen as follows. The first block of the message contains the
output of the previous iteration in the collision-finding algorithm. The message bits
in the second block are chosen in a way that causes a number of bits in the internal
state of the hash function be to zero, hence forcing the final output to a smaller
subset of possible outputs. The algorithm for selecting the second message block
requires O(1) time. The message selection algorithm is as follows:
1. Since carry propagation in addition is from least significant bits towards higher
bits, H ·b ( mod 2) is in fact a system of linear equations in GF(2), independent
of the 7 higher bits in each byte of H. Using simple linear algebra operations
in F2, bit 0 in each of the m state bytes can be forced to zero by selecting m
message bits appropriately. This is an O(1) step.
2. A precomputed lookup table is used to force a further c bits to zero. The table
has 2c entries and uses m + c message bits (since the table entries must also
have least significant bits as zeros). The table is generated by brute force by
computing 2c messages using linear algebra as in step 1, and indexing them
by c upper bits in the result (bit selection is arbitrary from the upper bits 1 . . . 7
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from each byte). Hence we can force further c bits to zero from step 1 by a
simple lookup. Each lookup requires O(1) time. The precomputation phase
requires O(2c) time.
Thus, by selecting 2m + c message bits in the second block in a certain way,
m + c bits in the 8m-bit internal state are forced to zero. The offline complexity of
the attack is O(2c) and the collision search algorithm is expected to find a collision
in O(2
1
2
(7m−c)) steps.
First consider the hypothetical case where the internal state has the same size as
the final output, i.e. 8m bits. If we choose c = 73m ≈ 2.33m, the overall complexity
of the algorithm will be O(22.33m), which is significantly less than O(24m) expected
by direct application of the birthday paradox. However, since the internal state of
LASH is twice as wide as the final output, the security goal of LASH is O(22m). This
is the rationale behind the final transform of LASH.
8.4 Conclusions and External Analysis
In this chapter we have presented a dedicated hash function, LASH. Some aspects
of its security can be reduced to a computationally hard lattice reduction problem.
We have also applied traditional symmetric cryptanalysis techniques, such as linear
and differential cryptanalysis during its design in order to make it more resistant to
such attacks.
After this work was published in [11], it was subjected to external cryptanalysis
by Contini et al [25]. With the parameter and IV selection given in this chapter, they
describe the following attacks on LASH-x:
- A time-memory tradeoff attack with 2
4
11
x complexity.
- A preimeage attack with 2
4
7
x complexity.
- A heuristic lattice-based collision attack attack that requires a small amount of
memory but requires very long messages. Based upon experiments, the lattice
attacks are expected to find collisions much faster than 2
x
2 .
These attacks depend upon all zero IV. However, other attacks can be utilized
for randomized IV values with higher complexity. The attacks in [11] exploit the
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inherent linearity of LASH in a number of ways; the paper contains a generalized
birthday attack [110], a lattice-based BZK LLL [103] attack, and an improvement
over the Hybrid attack described in Section 8.3.4.
The findings in [25] indicate that parameter choices given in this chapter do not
necessarily provide the expected level of security. LASH is fully parameterizable, so
we may be able to counter the attacks in [25] without major modifications to the
fundamental design. However, this requires further investigation.
CHAPTER 9
CONCLUSIONS
This thesis contains cryptanalytic results on a number of dedicated hash functions.
What is noteworthy is the diversity of methods used in analysis:
- The FSB hash function (Chapter 3) is based on a presumably hard problem
from coding theory. We observe that a small portion of the message space
can be reduced to a system of linear equations. We then use this observation
to break the hash function. This clearly demonstrates that having hard av-
erage case complexity does not help against cryptanalysis, when the attacker
specifically targets classes of special cases.
- The attack on FORK-256 (Chapter 4) exploits a subtle anomaly in the message
key schedule to build a successful meet-in-the-middle attack against the hash
function. With a slightly different choice of schedule details, this attack would
not work.
- We know that secure hash functions can be built from secure block ciphers.
But is the opposite true? In Chapter 5 we show that it is not, by demonstrating
attacks against block ciphers derived from hash functions. This demonstrates
that hash functions must be designed according to different principles than
block ciphers.
- There is a school of thought that symmetric cryptographic primitives should
be based on “hard problems” from other fields of computer science. Chapter 6
contains a sharp critique of this idea by demonstrating that VSH, a hash func-
tion whose collision resistance can be reduced to a hard problem in number
theory, does not meet all of the other properties (besides collision resistance)
required from a hash function. A hash function itself must be a hard problem
and should not demonstrate algebraic properties.
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- If one is faced with the task of attacking a “black box” hash function, statis-
tical and adaptive-statistical methods are usually the best way forward. In
Chapter 7, we discuss d-Monomial tests, which are based on the reasonable
assumption that the logical structure of the function is simple or regular.
- How would one then design a hash function? Chapter 8 contains one approach
to this complex engineering task. Our proposal, LASH, uses elements from
provable security (hard problems in lattices), instruction set parallelism and
cryptanalysis to arrive at a simple and fast dedicated hash function. However,
external cryptanalysis has indicated that the LASH security parameters need to
be adjusted to counter types of attack that we did not consider when designing
the hash function.
Our main observation is that a successful hash function cryptanalyst or designer
must have a big theoretical toolbox at their disposal. The methods used can be from
any field of computer science, mathematics and beyond; anything that works. If a
cryptographic primitive can be shown to be secure against one attack, this does not
offer any assurance against attacks using other methods.
This has led us to somewhat unusual definitions of the basic hash function secu-
rity properties such as collision resistance in Chapter 2. We feel that without assum-
ing an unrealistically restrictive model, a positive security proof would essentially be
an answer to the P=NP question. Hence we can only define what a cryptographic
break is; in the context of hash functions it is an anomaly that sets the function apart
from a random function.
It is a consensus among cryptographers that only continued scrutiny of every
detail of a cryptographic primitive can result in some assurance of its security. We
have shown that this certainly applies to the case of cryptographic hash functions.
Bibliography
[1] AJTAI, M. Generating hard instances of lattice problems. In Proc. 28th ACM
Symp. on Theory of Computing (1996), ACM, pp. 99–108.
[2] ANDERSON, R. The classification of hash functions. In Proc. Codes and
Cyphers: Cryptography and Coding IV (1995), pp. 83–93.
[3] AUGOT, D., FINIASZ, M., GABORIT, P., MANUEL, S., AND SENDRIER, N. SHA-
3 proposal: FSB. Submission to NIST. http://www-rocq.inria.fr/secret/
CBCrypto/fsbdoc.pdf., October 2008.
[4] AUGOT, D., FINIASZ, M., AND SENDRIER, N. A new dedicated 256-bit
hash function: FORK-256. In Progress in Cryptology–MyCrypt 2005 (2005),
vol. 3615 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Springer-Verlag, pp. 64–83.
[5] BARKER, E., AND KELSEY, J. Recommendation for random number genera-
tion using deterministic random bit generators (revised, 2007. NIST Special
Publication 800-90.
[6] BEKER, H., AND PIPER, F. Cipher systems: the protection of communications.
Northwood, 1982.
[7] BELLARE, M. New proofs for NMAC and HMAC: Security without collision
resistance. In Advances in Cryptology–CRYPTO 2006 (2006), vol. 4117 of
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Springer-Verlag, pp. 602–619.
[8] BELLARE, M., CANETTI, R., AND KRAWCZYK, H. Keying hash functions for
message authentication. In Advances in Cryptology–CRYPTO 1996 (1996),
vol. 1109 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Springer-Verlag, pp. 1–15.
103
BIBLIOGRAPHY 104
[9] BELLARE, M., CANETTI, R., AND KRAWCZYK, H. HMAC: Keyed-hashing for
message authentication. Tech. rep., IETF, 1997. RFC 2104.
[10] BELLARE, M., AND ROGAWAY, P. Random oracles are practical: A paradigm
for designing efficient protocols. In ACM Conference on Computer and Com-
munications Security (1993), pp. 62–73.
[11] BENTAHAR, K., PAGE, D., SAARINEN, M.-J., SILVERMAN, J., AND SMART, N.
LASH, 2006. 2nd NIST Cryptographic Hash Workshop.
[12] BIERE, A., HEULE, M., MAAREN, H. V., AND WALSH, T. Handbook of Satisfi-
ability. IOS Press, 2009.
[13] BIHAM, E., AND SHAMIR, A. Differential Cryptanalysis of the Data Encryption
Standard. Springer-Verlag, 1993.
[14] BIHAM, E., AND SHAMIR, A. Differential fault analysis of secret key cryptosys-
tems. In Advances in Cryptology–CRYPTO ’97 (1997), vol. 1294 of Lecture
Notes in Computer Science, Springer-Verlag, pp. 513–525.
[15] BIRYUKOV, A., AND WAGNER, D. Slide attacks. In Proc. Fast Software Encryp-
tion 1999 (1999), vol. 1636 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Springer-
Verlag, pp. 245–259.
[16] BIRYUKOV, A., AND WAGNER, D. Advanced slide attacks. In Advances in
Cryptology–EUROCRYPT 2000 (2000), vol. 1807 of Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, Springer-Verlag, pp. 589–606.
[17] BLACK, J., ROGAWAY, P., AND SHRIMPTON, T. Black-box analysis of the
block-cipher-based hash-function constructions from PGV. In Advances in
Cryptology–CRYPTO 2002 (2002), vol. 2442 of Lecture Notes in Computer Sci-
ence, Springer-Verlag, pp. 320–335.
[18] BONEH, D., DEMILLO, R. A., AND LIPTON, R. J. On the importance of check-
ing protocols for faults. In Advances in Cryptology–EuroCrypt ’97 (1997),
vol. 1233 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Springer-Verlag, pp. 37–51.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 105
[19] BROWN, D. R. L., ANTIPA, A., CAMPAGNA, M., AND STRUIK, R. ECOH: the
elliptic curve only hash. Tech. rep., Certicom Corp., Nov. 2008. First Round
NIST SHA-3 Candidate.
[20] CHANG, D., HONG, S., KANG, C., KANG, J., KIM, J., LEE, C., LEE, J., LEE, J.,
LEE, S., LEE, Y., LIM, J., AND SUNG, J. ARIRANG. Submission to NIST. http:
//ehash.iaik.tugraz.at/uploads/2/2c/Arirang.pdf, October 2008.
[21] CLOTE, P., AND KRANAKIS, E. Boolean Functions and Computation Models.
Springer-Verlag, 2002.
[22] CONTINI, S., AND A.K. LENSTRA, R. S. VSH, an efficient and provable colli-
sion resistant hash function. In Advances in Cryptology–EUROCRYPT 2006
(2006), vol. 4004 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Springer-Verlag,
pp. 165–185.
[23] CONTINI, S., LENSTRA, A. K., AND STEINFELD, R. VSH, an efficient and prov-
able collision resistant hash function, 2005. IACR ePrint Archive 2005/193.
[24] CONTINI, S., MATUSIEWICZ, AND PIEPRZYK, J. Extending FORK-256 attack
to the full hash function. In Information and Communications Security, 9th
International Conference, ICICS 2007 (2008), vol. 4861 of Lecture Notes in
Computer Science, Springer-Verlag, pp. 296–305.
[25] CONTINI, S., MATUSIEWICZ, K., PIEPRZYK, J., STEINFELD, R., JIAN, G., AN,
L., AND WANG, H. Cryptanalysis of LASH. In Proc. Fast Software Encryption
2008 (2008), vol. 5086 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Springer-Verlag,
pp. 207–223.
[26] COPPERSMITH, D. Analysis of ISO/CCITT Document X.509 Annex D. Tech.
rep., IBM Research Division, Yorktown Heights, N.Y., June 1989.
[27] CORON, J.-S., AND JOUX., A. Cryptanalysis of a provably secure crypto-
graphic hash function, 2004. IACR ePrint Archive 2004/013.
[28] COURTOIS, N. T. General principles of algebraic attacks and new design
criteria for components of symmetric ciphers. In AES 4 Conference, Bonn May
BIBLIOGRAPHY 106
10-12 2004 (2005), vol. 3373 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Springer-
Verlag, pp. 67–83.
[29] COURTOIS, N. T., AND BARD, G. V. Algebraic cryptanalysis of the data en-
cryption standard. In Cryptography and Coding 2007 (2007), vol. 4887 of
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Springer-Verlag, pp. 152–169.
[30] COURTOIS, N. T., NOHL, K., AND O’NEIL, S. Algebraic attacks on the crypto-
1 stream cipher in MIFARE Classic and Oyster cards, 2008. IACR ePrint
Archive 2008/166.
[31] COURTOIS, N. T., AND PIEPRZYK, J. Cryptanalysis of block ciphers with
overdefined systems of equations. In ASIACRYPT 2002 (2002), vol. 2501
of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Springer-Verlag, pp. 152–169.
[32] DAMGA˚RD, I. A design principle for hash functions. In Advances in
Cryptology–CRYPTO 1989 (1990), vol. 435 of Lecture Notes in Computer Sci-
ence, Springer-Verlag, pp. 416–427.
[33] DEN BOER, B., AND BOSSELAERS, A. Collisions for the compression function
of MD5. In Advances in Cryptology–EUROCRYPT 1993 (1994), vol. 765 of
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Springer-Verlag, pp. 293–304.
[34] DIERKS, R., AND RESCORLA, E. The transport layer security (TLS) protocol–
version 1.1, 2006. Internet Engineering Task Force RFC 4346.
[35] DOBBERTIN, H. Cryptanalysis of MD5 compress, 1996. Presented at EURO-
CRYPT ’96 rump session, May 14, 1996.
[36] FERGUSON, N., LUCKS, S., SCHNEIER, B., WHITING, D., BELLARE, M.,
KOHNO, T., CALLAS, J., AND WALKER, J. The Skein hash function family,
2008. Submission to NIST.
[37] FILIOL, E. A new statistical testing for symmetric ciphers and hash functions.
In Proc. ICICS 2002 (2002), vol. 2513 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science,
Springer-Verlag, pp. 342–353.
[38] FINIASZ, M., GABORIT, P., AND SENDRIER, N. Improved fast syndrome based
cryptographic hash functions, 2007. ECRYPT Hash Function Workshop 2007.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 107
[39] FRIEDMAN, W. F. The index of coincidence and its applications in cryptology.
No. 22. Riverbank Laboratories, Department of Ciphers, 1922.
[40] GIVANT, S., AND HALMOS, P. Introduction to Boolean Algebras. Undergradu-
ate Texts in Mathematics. Springer-Verlag, 2009.
[41] GOLDREICH, O. Foundations of Cryptography, Vol. 1, Basic Tools. Cambridge
University Press, 2007.
[42] GOLDREICH, O., GOLDWASSER, S., AND HALEVI, S. Collision-free hashing
from lattice problems. Tech. Rep. TR96-042, Electronic Colloquium on Com-
putational Complexity (ECCC), 1996.
[43] GOLDREICH, O., GOLDWASSER, S., AND MICALI, S. How to construct random
functions. Journal of the ACM 33, 4 (1986), 792–807.
[44] GREENWOOD, P. G., AND NIKULIN, M. S. A guide to chi-squared testing. Wiley
series in probability and statistics. Wiley, 1996.
[45] GROSSMAN, E. K., AND TUCKERMAN, B. Analysis of a Feistel-like cipher weak-
ened by having no rotating key. Tech. rep., IBM Thomas J. Watson Research
Centre, 1977.
[46] GUO, J., MATUSIEWICZ, K., KNUDSEN, L. R., LING, S., AND
WANG, H. Practical pseudo-collisions for hash functions ARIRANG-
224/384. Available online at http://ehash.iaik.tugraz.at/uploads/9/
9a/Arirang-pseudo-sha3zoo.pdf., 2009.
[47] GUTMANN, P. C. Secure file system (SFS) version 1.0 documentation, 1993.
Available at: http://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/~pgut001sfs/.
[48] HANDSCHUH, H., KNUDSEN, L. R., AND NACCACHE, D. Analysis of SHA-1 in
encryption mode. In Topics in Cryptology–RSA-CT 2001 (2001), vol. 2020 of
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Springer-Verlag, pp. 70–83.
[49] HANDSCHUH, H., AND NACCACHE, D. SHACAL, 2000. Available at: http:
//www.cryptonessie.org.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 108
[50] HANDSCHUH, H., AND NACCACHE, D. SHACAL: A family of block ciphers,
2002. Available at: http://www.cryptonessie.org.
[51] HA˚STAD, J. On using RSA with low exponent in a public key network. In
Advances in Cryptology–CRYPTO 1985 (1985), vol. 218 of Lecture Notes in
Computer Science, Springer-Verlag, pp. 403–408.
[52] HILTGEN, A. P. Towards a better understanding of one-wayness: Fac-
ing linear permutations. In Advances in Cryptology–EUROCRYPT’98 (1998),
vol. 1403 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Springer-Verlag, pp. 319–33.
[53] HONG, D., CHANG, D., SUNG, J., LEE, S., HONG, S., LEE, J., MOON, D.,
AND CHEE, S. A new dedicated 256-bit hash function: FORK-256. In Proc.
Fast Software Encryption 2006 (2007), vol. 4047 of Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, Springer-Verlag, pp. 195–209.
[54] HONG, D., CHANG, D., SUNG, J., LEE, S., HONG, S., LEE, J., MOON, D., AND
CHEE, S. New FORK-256, 2007. IACR ePrint Archive 2007/185.
[55] HONG, D., KIM, W.-H., AND KOO, B. Preimage attack on ARIRANG. Cryptol-
ogy ePrint Archive, Report 2009/147. http://eprint.iacr.org/2009/147.
pdf., 2009.
[56] JOUX, A. Multicollisions in iterated hash functions. application to cascaded
constructions. In Advances in Cryptology–CRYPTO 2004 (2004), vol. 3152 of
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Springer-Verlag, pp. 306–316.
[57] KALISKI, B. S., AND ROBSHAW, M. J. B. Fast block cipher proposal. In Proc.
Fast Software Encryption 1993 (1994), vol. 809 of Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, Springer-Verlag, pp. 33–40.
[58] KELSEY, J., AND KOHNO, T. Herding hash functions and the Nostradamus
attack, 2005. IACR ePrint Archive 2005/281.
[59] KELSEY, J., AND SCHNEIER, B. Second preimages on n-bit hash functions for
much less than 2n work. In Advances in Cryptology–EUROCRYPT 2005 (2005),
vol. 3495 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Springer-Verlag, pp. 474–490.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 109
[60] KNUTH, D. E. The Art of Computer Programming, vol. 2: Seminumerical Algo-
rithms, 2 ed. Addison-Wesley, 1981.
[61] KNUTH, D. E. The Art of Computer Programming, vol. 3: Sorting and Search-
ing, 2 ed. Addison-Wesley, 1981.
[62] KOCHER, P. C. Timing attacks on implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA,
DSS, and other systems. In Advances in Cryptology–CRYPTO 1996 (1996),
vol. 1109 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Springer-Verlag, pp. 104–113.
[63] KOCHER, P. C., E, J. J., AND JUN, B. Differential power analysis. In Advances
in Cryptology–CRYPTO 1999 (1999), vol. 1666 of Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, Springer-Verlag, pp. 388–397.
[64] LUCKS, S. Design principles for iterated hash functions, 2004. IACR ePrint
Archive 2004/253.
[65] MATSUI, M. Linear cryptoanalysis method for DES cipher. In Advances in
Cryptology – EUROCRYPT 1993 (1994), vol. 765 of Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, Springer-Verlag, pp. 386–397.
[66] MATUSIEWICZ, CONTINI, S., AND PIEPRZYK, J. Weaknesses of the FORK-256
compression function, 2006. IACR ePrint Archive 2006/317.
[67] MATUSIEWICZ, PEYRIN, T., BILLET, O., CONTINI, S., AND PIEPRZYK, J.
Cryptanalysis of FORK-256. In Proc. Fast Software Encryption 2007 (2007),
vol. 4593 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Springer-Verlag, pp. 19–38.
[68] MAURER, U. Indistinguishability of random systems. In Advances in Cryp-
tology – EUROCRYPT 2002 (2002), vol. 2332 of Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, Springer-Verlag, pp. 110–133.
[69] MENDEL, F., LANO, J., AND PRENEEL, B. Cryptanalysis of reduced variants of
the FORK-256 hash function. In Topics in Cryptology–CT-RSA 2007 (2007),
vol. 4377 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Springer-Verlag, pp. 85–100.
[70] MENEZES, A., VAN OORSCHOT, P., AND VANSTONE, S. Handbook of Applied
Cryptography, first ed. CRC Press, 1996.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 110
[71] MERKLE, R., AND HELLMAN, M. Hiding information and signatures in trap-
door knapsacks. IEEE Trans. Information Theory 24, 5 (September 1978),
525–530.
[72] MIYAGUCHI, S., OHTA, K., AND WATA, M. I. 128-bit hash function (N-hash).
NTT Review 6, 2 (1990), 128–132.
[73] MORRIS, R., AND THOMPSON, K. Password security: A case history. Commu-
nications of the ACM 22 (November 1979), 594–597.
[74] MURPHY, S. The power of NIST’s statistical testing of AES candidates. Tech.
rep., Royal Holloway, University of London, Apr. 2000. AES Comment to
NIST.
[75] NICHOLS, R. K., AND LEKKAS, P. C. Wireless Security–Models, Threats, and
Solutions. McGraw-Hill, 2002.
[76] NISHIMURA, K., AND SIBUYA, M. Probability to meet in the middle. Journal
of Cryptology, 2 (1990), 13–22.
[77] NIST. FIPS PUB 180-1: Secure hash standard, 1995. Federal Information
Processing Standards Publication.
[78] NIST. FIPS PUB 180-2: Digital signature standard (DSS), 2000. Federal
Information Processing Standards Publication.
[79] NIST. FIPS PUB 180-2: Secure hash standard, 2001. Federal Information
Processing Standards Publication.
[80] NIST. Announcing the development of new hash algorithm(s) for the revi-
sion of federal information processing standard (FIPS) 180–2, secure hash
standard. Federal Register 72, 14 (2007), 2861–2863.
[81] NIST. Cryptographic hash function competition, May 2009. Available at:
http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/hash/sha-3/.
[82] PALE, E., AND AHTOKARI, R. Suomen Radiotiedustelu 1927 – 1944. Viestikoe-
laitoksen kilta, 1997. In Finnish. Published by the Guild of the Communica-
tions Research Establishment (Finnish Signals Intelligence).
BIBLIOGRAPHY 111
[83] POLLARD, J. A Monte Carlo method for factorization. BIT Numerical Mathe-
matics 15, 3 (1975), 331–334.
[84] PRENEEL, B. Analysis and design of cryptographic hash functions. PhD thesis,
Katholieke Universiteit Leuven (Belgium), January 1993.
[85] PRENEEL, B., GOVAERTS, R., AND VANDEWALLE, J. Hash functions based
on block ciphers: A synthetic approach. In Advances in Cryptology–CRYPTO
1993 (1993), vol. 773 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Springer-Verlag,
pp. 368–378.
[86] QUISQUATER, J.-J., AND DEESCAILLE, J.-P. How easy is collision search?
application to DES. In Advances in Cryptology–EUROCRYPT 1989 (1990),
vol. 434 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Springer-Verlag, pp. 429–434.
[87] RIJMEN, V., AND BARRETO, P. Whirlpool, 2004. Seventh hash function of
ISO/IEC 10118-3:2004.
[88] RIVEST, R. The MD4 message-digest algorithm, 1990. Internet Engineering
Task Force RFC 1186.
[89] RIVEST, R. The MD5 message-digest algorithm, 1992. Internet Engineering
Task Force RFC 1321.
[90] RIVEST, R. L. The MD6 hash function – a proposal to NIST
for SHA-3. Submission to NIST, October 2008. Available at:
http://groups.csail.mit.edu/cis/md6/submitted-2008-10-27/
Supporting_Documentation/md6_report.pdf.
[91] ROGAWAY, P. Formalizing human ignorance: Collision-resistant hashing
without the keys. In Proc. INDOCRYPT 2006 (2006), vol. 4341 of Lecture
Notes in Computer Science, Springer-Verlag, pp. 211–228.
[92] ROGAWAY, P., AND SHRIMPTON, T. Cryptographic hash-function basics:
Definitions, implications, and separations for preimage resistance, second-
preimage resistance, and collision resistance. In Proc. FSE 2004 (2004),
vol. 3017 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Springer-Verlag, pp. 371–388.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 112
[93] RSA. RSA-1024 factoring challenge. Available at: http://www.
rsasecurity.com/rsalabs/node.asp?id=2093.
[94] RUKHIN ET. AL., A. A statistical test suite for random and pseudorandom
number generators for cryptographic applications. Tech. Rep. 800-22, Na-
tional Institute of Standards and Technology, 2001.
[95] SAARINEN, M.-J. O. A chosen key attack against the secret S-boxes of GOST,
1998. Unpublished manuscript. Available from http://citeseer.ist.psu.
edu/saarinen98chosen.html.
[96] SAARINEN, M.-J. O. Cryptanalysis of block ciphers based on SHA-1 and MD5.
In Proc. Fast Software Encryption 2003 (2003), vol. 2887 of Lecture Notes in
Computer Science, Springer-Verlag, pp. 36–44.
[97] SAARINEN, M.-J. O. Chosen-IV statistical attacks against eSTREAM ciphers.
In Proc. SECRYPT 2006, International Conference on Security and Cryptogra-
phy, Setubal, Portugal, August 7-10, 2006. (2006).
[98] SAARINEN, M.-J. O. d-monomial tests are effective against stream ciphers.
In State of the Art in Stream Ciphers (SASC) 2006 Workshop Record. Leuven,
Belgium, February 2-3, 2006. (2006).
[99] SAARINEN, M.-J. O. Security of VSH in the real world. In Progress in
Cryptology–INDOCRYPT 2006 (2006), vol. 4329 of Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, Springer-Verlag, pp. 95–103.
[100] SAARINEN, M.-J. O. Linearization attacks against syndrome based hashes.
In Proc. INDOCRYPT 2007 (2007), vol. 4859 of Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, Springer-Verlag, pp. 1–9.
[101] SAARINEN, M.-J. O. A meet-in-the-middle collision attack against the new
FORK-256. In Proc. INDOCRYPT 2007 (2007), vol. 4859 of Lecture Notes in
Computer Science, Springer-Verlag, pp. 10–17.
[102] SASAO, T., AND DEBNATH, D. Generalized Reed-Muller expressions: Com-
plexity and an exact minimization algorithm. IEICE Trans. Fundamentals E79,
12 (1996), 2123–2130.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 113
[103] SCHNORR, C. P. Block reduced lattice bases and successive minima. Combi-
natorics, Probability and Computing, 3 (1994), 507–533.
[104] SHANKS, D. Class number, a theory of factorization and genera. In Proc.
Symp. Pure Math. (1979), AMS, pp. 415–550.
[105] SHANKS, J. Computation of the Fast Walsh-Fourier Transform. IEEE Transac-
tions on Computers C-18 (May 1969), 459–459.
[106] SNEDECOR, G. W., AND COCHRAN, W. G. Statistical Methods, 8 ed. Iowa
State University Press, 1989.
[107] STONE, M. H. The theory of representation for boolean algebras. Transac-
tions of the American Mathematical Society 40, 1 (July 1936), 37–111.
[108] VAN OORSCHOT, P., AND WIENER, M. Parallel collision search with cryptana-
lytic applications. Journal of Cryptology 12, 1 (1999), 1–28.
[109] WAGNER, D. A slide attack on SHA-1, 2001. Unpublished manuscript and
personal communication. 04/06/01.
[110] WAGNER, D. A generalized birthday problem. In Advances in Cryptology–
CRYPTO 2002 (2002), vol. 2442 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science,
Springer-Verlag, pp. 288–303.
[111] WANG, X., LAI, X., FENG, D., CHEN, H., AND YU, X. Cryptanalysis of the
hash functions MD4 and RIPEMD. In Advances in Cryptology–EUROCRYPT
2005 (2005), vol. 3494 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Springer-Verlag,
pp. 1–18.
[112] WANG, X., YIN, Y., AND YU, H. Finding collisions in the full SHA-1. In
Advances in Cryptology–CRYPTO 2005 (2005), vol. 3621 of Lecture Notes in
Computer Science, Springer-Verlag, pp. 17–36.
[113] WANG, X., AND YU, H. How to break MD5 and other hash functions. In
Advances in Cryptology–EUROCRYPT 2005 (2005), vol. 3494 of Lecture Notes
in Computer Science, Springer-Verlag, pp. 19–35.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 114
[114] WANG, X., YU, H., AND YIN, Y. L. Efficient collision search attacks on SHA-0.
In Advances in Cryptology–CRYPTO 2005 (2005), vol. 3621 of Lecture Notes
in Computer Science, Springer-Verlag, pp. 1–16.
[115] WEGENER, I. The complexity of Boolean functions. Wiley, Teubner, 1987.
Wiley-Teubner series in Computer Science.
[116] WINTERNITZ, R. A secure one-way hash function built from DES. In Proc.
IEEE Symposium on Information Security and Privacy (1984), IEEE Press,
pp. 88–90.
[117] YLONEN, R., AND LONVICK, C. The secure shell (SSH) authentication proto-
col, 2006. Internet Engineering Task Force RFC 4252.
[118] YLONEN, R., AND LONVICK, C. The secure shell (SSH) connection protocol,
2006. Internet Engineering Task Force RFC 4254.
[119] YLONEN, R., AND LONVICK, C. The secure shell (SSH) protocol architecture,
2006. Internet Engineering Task Force RFC 4251.
[120] YLONEN, R., AND LONVICK, C. The secure shell (SSH) transport layer proto-
col, 2006. Internet Engineering Task Force RFC 4253.
[121] ZHEGALKIN, I. I. On the technique of calculating propositions in symbolic
logic”. Matematicheskii Sbornik, 43 (1927), 9–28. In Russian.
